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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to answer what causes some governments to restrict foreign 
funding to domestic civil society organizations while others do not. These 
repressive measures have increased significantly in all regions of the globe 
recently and existing research has yet to provide an encompassing explanation for 
the trend. Considering that neither foreign funding or government repression are 
exactly novel phenomena urges for looking closer at the increase of restrictions. 
By elaborating on Levitsky and Way’s theory on linkage and leverage (2010) and 
expanding on research gaps found in previous literature, the thesis argues that the 
issue is driven by a shift in geopolitical power relations. The thesis argues that 
governments implement restrictions depending on the country’s linkages to 
western and non-western external powers, specifically by how their respective 
pressure and norm preferences raise or reduce the costs of repressive behavior. A 
comparative, qualitative analysis on Hungary and Georgia did not support this 
claim. Still, the findings highlight theoretical insights into the concept of linkages 
and provide recommendations for further studies. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Civil society has come under attack in recent years. In all regions of the world, 
government crackdowns on civil society’s ability to organize, claim rights and 
influence public policy are increasing. Since 2012, over 100 laws aimed at 
restricting funding, operations and registration of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) have been passed in different countries (IHRG, 2016, p. 8-9). In 2014, the 
majority of the global population lived in restricted civil societies and serious 
threats against civic freedoms was noticed in 96 countries (Civicus, 2015, p. 53). 
In 2016, global freedom dropped for the eleventh year in a row and countries with 
declining political rights and civic liberties were double to those with gains 
(Freedom House, 2017). 
This trend of civil society restrictions is referred to as closing space and has 
come to be held as a driver of state fragility, conflict and regional instability 
(Carothers, 2016, p.3; Kiai, 2013, p. 9). Current research on the subject is policy-
oriented and somewhat incoherent but consensus has been reached on a few key 
factors. First, closing space is argued to be more common in hybrid and semi-
democratic states and felt the most by CSOs engaged in democracy, human rights 
and advocacy (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2015, p. 6; Hayman et. al. 2013, p. 8; 
van der Borgh & Terwindt, 2014, p. 92). Second, measures related to closing 
space are being shared and replicated between governments to an ever larger 
extent and range from arbitrary laws, discriminatory policies to extra-judicial 
violence (Gershman & Allen, 2006, p. 40-45; Way, 2016, p. 65; Koesel & Bunce, 
2013). Third, amongst these measures, restrictions against foreign funding is 
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considered the most wide-spread and effective strategy to undermine CSOs and 
civil society (Carothers, 2015, p. 1; Rutzen, 2015, p. 30; Kiai, 2013, p. 4-5). In 
turn, the impacts caused by restrictions against foreign funding have led them to 
be framed as “the leading edge of wider crackdowns on civil society” (Carothers, 
2015, p. 1) that “undermine civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights as 
a whole” (Kiai, 2013, p. 5).   
Looking closer at the spread of restrictions indicate that it is not only an issue 
about domestic repression, it also reflects a larger struggle between western and 
non-western powers and norms. This is clearly reflected by how foreign civil 
society support is closely connected to western liberal norms while the majority of 
restrictions are found in non-western countries, usually justified on the basis of 
state-sovereignty (Gershman & Allen, 2006; Rutzen, 2015; Claessen & de Lange, 
2016). Considering that foreign funding has since long been an established 
international practice gives further weight for approaching the increase of 
restrictions in relation to changes in international power relations (Ishkanian, 
2007; Wolff & Poppe, 2015). By connecting restrictions to this larger systemic 
struggle, the thesis aims to explain the increase of restrictions through the 
question what causes some governments to restrict foreign funding to domestic 
civil society organizations while others do not? 
The thesis claims that the increase of restrictions is explained by shift in 
geopolitical power relations and norms between western and non-western states. 
This claim draws on two debates discussed in political science and development 
studies during the last decade. The first debate concerns whether the international 
political system is becoming more multipolar and whether this is threatening 
democracy (Cooley, 2015; Diamond, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2015). Seemingly, 
geopolitical shift illustrated by the rise of new powerful states have come to 
challenge western hegemony in certain regions. In turn, the second debate focus 
on western international aid and its impact on democratic development (Wood 
2016; Tandon & Brown, 2013; Howell et al., 2008; Carothers & de Gramont, 
2013). Such discussions highlight power relations between the west and the ‘rest’ 
how this impact state sovereignty and civil society.  
  3 
The thesis main claim about larger systemic changes is captured by the theory 
of linkage and leverage which explains how the interaction between domestic and 
external factors describes repressive government behavior and political outcomes 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010). To investigate the issue, the thesis assumes that 
governments are rational actors that consider domestic and external factors in 
their struggle to remain in power and hypothesizes that restrictions against foreign 
funding occur in countries dominated by non-western linkages as this decreases 
the dependence on western linkages and limit western pressure. Under such 
circumstances, the costs of restrictions are lowered since repressive behavior that 
violates western liberal norms are less likely to be sanctioned. The thesis tests this 
hypothesis by using the structured focused comparison in a cross-case analysis on 
Hungary and Georgia. The cases are selected based on their similarity across 
structural conditions, linkages, geopolitical power relations and to guarantee 
variance in the dependent variable of restrictions against foreign funding. Still, the 
empirical findings did not support the hypothesis. In Hungary, although non-
western linkages clearly decreased dependence on western linkages and mitigated 
western pressure, it was in fact western linkages themselves that lowered the cost 
of restrictions. In Georgia, the government displayed repressive behavior in spite 
of strong western linkages as its strategic value for the west limited external 
pressure. 
The thesis starts with a review of previous literature on state-society relations, the 
role of donors and foreign aid, and geopolitical power transition. This is followed 
by an outline of the theoretical framework that connects assumptions drawn from 
the literature together with an elaboration of Levitsky and Way’s linkage and 
leverage theory before presenting the thesis’ hypothesis. This is preceded by a 
description of the research design, method and case selection. The case analyses 
on Hungary and Georgia are then presented followed by a discussion on their 
findings. The thesis is concluded with a short summary and suggestions for 
further studies. 
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2 Previous Literature 
In-depth studies on the recent restrictions against foreign funding are lacking in 
research but the topic can be linked to other theoretical discussions in political 
science and development studies. Three research areas are of particular 
importance to the thesis and will serve as the basis for the theoretical framework, 
namely state-society relations, the role of donors and foreign aid, and geopolitical 
power transitions. 
2.1 State-Society Relations 
In developing and democratizing countries, many CSOs depend on foreign 
funding in order to provide basic services and advocate for political change and 
protection of rights. However, domestic links with such and other external factors 
is much influenced by the state and its approach to civil society. In this sense, two 
main approaches are embedded in the understanding of state-society relations. 
The “Gramscian” idea of civil society regards it as an arena of political 
contestation while as the “Tocquevillian” interpret civil society as capturing the 
plurality and diversity of civic action organized around common public interests 
(Howell, 2012, p. 63). This reflect how civil society function both as a counterpart 
and complement to the state in the production of mutual benefits. However, the 
government’s approach to civil society is rarely unison and depend on contextual 
factors like the state’s institutional arrangements and the social composition of 
civil society (Bloodgood et al, 2014; Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2014, p. 19). This 
can be seen in how the government repress or benefit groups in civil society to 
gain support (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007) or in how laws that control civil society often 
stem from the historic and socio-political context (Mayhew, 2005, p. 729).  
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CSOs that function as state counterparts are generally more challenging toward 
the government. However, even CSOs that complement the state, by for example 
providing basic services or attracting resources, may involve a number of 
domestic and external actors that the government must balance against its political 
control. In this sense, the government’s approach to an autonomous and organized 
civil society is greatly dependent on its self-perceived legitimacy as potential 
threats to its power clearly outweigh CSO benefits (Bratton, 1989, p. 576). 
Government approach to civil society is also argued to be dependent on state 
capacity (Rahman, 2006, p. 456). In this sense, opinions differ whether a weak 
state empowers civil society or vice versa (Wang, 1999). Seemingly, both strong 
and weak states are equally likely to permit an independent civil society as they 
are to repress it (Jackson, 2010, p. 115; Rotberg, 2004). This emphasize the 
importance of civil society’s autonomy as it limits dependency and facilitates 
counterpart functions that are vital both for constraining state power and 
legitimize its authority. However, overt autonomy might also undermine the state, 
and in turn also civil society, for example by weakening institutionalized 
protection of rights and freedoms (Diamond, 1994, p. 14). Still, as civil society 
and the state are connected, some level of autonomy must be guaranteed in order 
to protect rights and CSO functions (Hall, 1995, p. 16).  
Although state-society relations serve as the basis for democratic development 
it may also be a source of conflict. In this sense, contention arise as civil society 
engage spaces under state control or when the state strives to reclaim or penetrate 
new spaces. Under such conditions, civil society space is a zero-sum game as the 
state or society benefit on behalf of the other. Positive-sum games require 
sufficient civil society and state interests to align or for civil society to assists in 
policy implementation (Bratton, 1989, p. 428-429). Still, both negative and 
positive changes in civil society space can lead to conflict as the former decrease 
civil society’s autonomy while the latter may cause the government to perceive 
itself as threatened (Tandon & Brown, 2013, p. 789-790). Conflict due to positive 
changes can be seen during democratization processes as civil society engages the 
state by expanding collective claim-making (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009, p. 449).  
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2.1.1 The impact of foreign funding on state-society 
relations 
State-society relations is an important factor for explaining domestic political 
conditions but as been touched upon, this is also subject to influence from external 
factors. In contexts of development and democratization, foreign civil society 
support can have significant impacts and may even re-define power relations 
between state and society. Seemingly, western foreign funding usually favors 
CSOs that function as state counterparts. This is often the case in western 
democracy promotion strategies but may also be used to avoid confiscation of 
funds by the government (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2014, p. 32-33; Gleditsch & 
Ward, 2006, p. 919). During the 1990s, foreign funding coupled with external 
pressure on developing and transitioning states triggered a rapid increase of CSOs 
in many developing countries (Reimann, 2006). This fostered strong links 
between domestic recipient CSOs and external, mainly western, donors. In turn, 
by drawing on these links and attracting international attention, this has made 
CSOs themselves capable of instigating external pressure on governments. 
Increased awareness of CSOs’ capacity amongst governments may therefore be a 
potential explanation for the increase of restrictions against foreign funding 
(Dupuy, et al., 2014, p. 4-5, 10) and for how some governments have come to 
share and replicate restrictive policies amongst each other (Chenoweth, 2017, p. 
95). Still, further factors must be weighed in. In Bangladesh for example, 
restrictive CSO-legislation stem from a period of instability when civil society 
challenged the political legitimacy of the government (Mayhew, 2005, p. 733-
736). In Egypt on the other hand, the government implemented restrictions in line 
with the will of the electorate as the majority of Egyptians opposed U.S. funding 
to domestic CSOs (Rutzen, 2015, p. 41). 
Seemingly, the main incentive for governments to restrict foreign support is to 
guarantee their hold on power (Wiktorowicz, 2002; Jackson, 2010). At the same 
time, governments must also consider their international reputation. Failing to do 
so can in fact threaten the power of the government since external reactions to 
repression can trigger domestic political changes (Burgerman, 2001). Thus, it 
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should be presumed that governments ought to consider the risk of both domestic 
and international retaliation when using of repression in order to protect power. 
Still, it seems problematic to assess whether such behavior indicate whether 
governments are under sufficient or insufficient pressure (Christensen & 
Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2014). However, domestic and external pressure 
can also be undermined by the foreign funders themselves. Seemingly, external 
donors often favor geopolitical and economic interests when they clash with 
support to civil society (Ambrosio, 2014). In Honduras, the U.S. has allegedly 
prioritized security cooperation over defaming the government for repression 
(Hayman et al., 2013, p. 19). In Ethiopia, the government has been able to avoid 
international pressure following restrictions due to its status as a strategic western 
ally (Dupuy et. al., 2014, p. 26). 
2.2 The role of donors and foreign aid 
Restrictions against foreign funding are sometimes part of broader attacks against 
all forms of external influence. In some countries, this has even caused prominent 
actors like USAID, Freedom House and the Open Society Institute to seize their 
operations (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014, p. 13-14). Still, external actors are 
not only at the receiving end of restrictions. They may in fact be complicit in 
restrictions as their practices sometimes constitute as foreign intervention in 
domestic politics (Stuenkel, 2013, 341-342; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006, p. 919; 
Banks et al., 2015, p. 712). Even the relations between international donors, 
governments and CSOs can implicate foreign actors in restrictions. For example, 
donor-CSO alliances can trigger government hostility toward the latter while 
donor-government alliances may obstruct the former to protect CSOs. Also, 
donors can provide the government with reasons for restrictions since their 
demands can undermine the local accountability and legitimacy of CSOs (Wood, 
2016, p. 535). Donor demands can also have negative impacts regardless of the 
government’s involvement as it come at the expanse of CSOs’ “emancipatory and 
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political roles” (Howell et. al, 2008, p. 87-88). In this sense, studies have found a 
correlation between increase of restrictions and donor demands: 
 
Figure 1. Restrictions-donor demands correlation (Heiss & Kelly, 2017, p. 3). 
This touches upon international development’s inherent dilemma of having 
become an “anti-politics machine”, meaning that is overtly prone to technical 
rendering that fail to bring about substantial political change (Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013, p. 176). Foreign funding has therefore been accused of 
undermining local grass-root mobilization, CSO accountability and civil society’s 
function as an advocate for social and political change (Chahim & Prakash, 2013, 
p. 508-509). Seemingly, foreign funding can even undermine political institutions 
by turning CSOs into professionalized and non-democratic organizations 
(Boussard, 2003, p. 122-123). Under such circumstance, governments have every 
reason to fear foreign funding and restrict CSOs on the basis of illegitimacy. To 
the least, this may be triggered by how donors deliberately bypass the government 
in domestic interventions (Dietrich, 2013). In this sense, research has found an 
inverse relationship between citizen’s level of confidence in CSOs vis-à-vis their 
government (Ron & Crow, 2015). 
The impact of donors and foreign aid has and remains largely connected to 
western actors. However, this seems to be changing as non-traditional donor states 
(NTDS) are increasing their influence in the international arena. By providing 
governance and development models based on non-interference, NTDS outrival 
western alternatives and, allegedly, increase the spread of non-western norms 
(Cooley, 2015, p. 58; Lagerkvist, 2012, p. 153; Carothers & Samet-Marram, 2015, 
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p. 30). China, India and Brazil’s unconditional development financing in Zambia 
have allegedly strengthened state sovereignty and eased the dependence on 
traditional donors (Kragelund, 2014, p. 158). Although some argue that both 
western and non-western donors’ promote good governance and human rights 
amongst recipients’ behavior (Petrikova, 2015), most seem to considers this shift 
to be negative for international development and civil society support (Fowler, 
2016, p. 574, 576; Howell, 2012, p. 43; Hayman et. al. 2013, p. 8) 
2.3 Competing Norms 
The differences between western donors and NTDS capture an incompatibility 
between internationally established norms. This is evident in international 
development as foreign actors’ promotion of human rights and democracy 
inevitably challenge state sovereignty and self-determination (Breen, 2015). In 
turn, foreign funding and restrictions reflect how non-negotiable claims on 
individual human rights clash with states’ right to collective self-determination. 
At the level of international politics, these normative claims are often used to 
mask underlying interests. Seemingly, whether governments impose or oppose 
restrictions they highlight the norm that best justify their self-interests (Wolff & 
Poppe, 2015; Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010, p. 2). This is captured by Krasner’s 
notion about sovereignty as organized hypocrisy. Seemingly, periods of political 
instability promote both state sovereignty and international protection of rights as 
domestic governments seek to remain in power while external actors seek to 
further influence and contain spill-over effects (Krasner, 1999). This is illustrated 
by the democratization wave during the 1990s as western powers and institutions 
pressured developing and transition states to open up political space and 
implement liberal regulations in domestic CSO sectors (Reimann, 2006, p. 59-62). 
However, some argue that this process also led to the current backlash against 
western norms as it caused a spread of partially democratized states (Gershman & 
Allen, 2006, p. 37). This can be explained by the concept of diffusion processes 
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which describes how transnational interaction between states cause transmission 
of norms (Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010, p. 5). This has been argued to explain 
the cause behind recent restrictions in Venezuela since the government, with the 
support from its new authoritarian allies, China and Russia, thus also aligned with 
their norms (Gill, 2016). 
2.4 Ideological Struggle 
Seemingly, the incompatibility between international norms is often framed as 
divided between western and non-western states, each propagating for democracy 
and human rights or state sovereignty and self-determination. This is captured by 
current debates on ideological struggles in the international arena and how this 
impact civil society repression, specifically in studies on authoritarianism and 
autocracy promotion. In such research, opinions differ whether there is a global 
surge in autocracies and if such states, like democracies, also engage in external 
promotion of government. 
2.4.1 Rise of Authoritarianism? 
Some argue that authoritarian governments are expanding their power in the 
international arena through own forms of soft-power and regional organizations. 
Supposedly, the shift towards a more multipolar global system has caused a rise of 
non-western and non-democratic counter-norms that are restructuring 
international politics. Stuenkel claims that this will have a great impact on western 
democracy promotion as “[t]he world’s decision-making elite is becoming less 
western, with fewer common interests, and more ideological diversity” (Stuenkel, 
2013, p. 339). On a similar note, Cooley states that “[n]owhere is the contrast 
between the relatively democratization-friendly world of twenty years ago and 
today’s harsher international environment more apparent than in the NGO realm” 
(Cooley, 2015, p. 50-53). The progress is also manifested by non-western powers 
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growing tendency to accuse the west for supporting domestic upheaval, a rhetoric 
which is also used to justify restrictions against foreign funding (Carothers & 
Youngs, 2015, p. 21).  
The alleged advancement of anti-western and non-democratic powers has 
raised questions whether this is progressing on behalf of democracy. Some argue 
that the geopolitical shift and democratic decline are in fact caused by the 
passivity of democracies themselves. This is reasoned for by how autocracy has 
dominated throughout history, thus framing democracy as an exception of liberty 
in need of active protection (Kagan, 2015, p. 29-30). Democratic passivity has 
also been raised in relation to more progressive arguments, claiming that 
autocracies will eventually be unable to resist how globalization, economic 
development and spread of information technology increase demands for 
accountability, transparency and political freedom (Diamond, 2015, p. 153-154).  
Nonetheless, the reasoning on passivity raises the question of why democratic 
governments would have stepped down from protecting democracy in the first 
place. In this sense, some argue that the pessimism toward the current situation of 
global democracy has wrongfully equated democratic recession with the absence 
of democratization. Seemingly, the post-cold war era of the 1990s was more a 
matter of autocratic crisis than a democratization wave. The re-consolidation of 
previously weak autocracies in the early 2000s should therefore not be interpreted 
as a decline of democracy as many governments were not even close to such a 
transition. Instead, democracy has proven highly resilient in spite of the recent 
financial crisis, the decline of EU and U.S.’ influence and the growing 
assertiveness of Russia and China (Levitsky & Way, 2016, p. 48-52, 57). 
However, some argue that the same factors have halted global democratization 
and may eventually determine the outcome of the struggle between democracy 
and autocracy, for example by states like China and their ability to balance high 
economic growth without democratizing (Plattner, 2014, p. 15). 
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2.4.2 Autocracy Promotion 
The ideological struggle between democracy and autocracy is also approached by 
studies on autocracy promotion. Those who see this as a deliberate practice 
usually lift regional power structures and spread of illiberal norms as the main 
driving forces (Jackson, 2010; Cooley, 2015; Demars, 2015, p. 252; Walker, 
2016). Others raise the notion of confusing autocracy promotion with the 
opposing of democracy promotion as illiberal regimes only engage in the latter 
when they perceive themselves or their geopolitical interests as challenged 
(Babayan, 2015, p. 439). Thus, illiberal regimes may unintentionally enhance and 
stabilize autocracy in their regions when countering democracy promotion. Still, 
the same measures may also strengthen democracy by encouraging domestic 
liberal forces and western democracy promoters (Börzel, 2015, p. 525). Both 
outcomes are illustrated by Russia whose incentive as a regional power has caused 
stricter environment in some places while promoting western relations and 
democratization in others (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2014). As western democracy 
promotion also causes similar counter-productive effect, some explain the 
ambiguity behind external democratic and autocratic intervention by drawing 
attention to how their influence is channeled through domestic political 
competition (Sasse, 2013, p. 553-555). In this sense, the impact of external 
powers depends both on their respective counter-effect on each other and the 
domestic balance between liberal and illiberal forces (Börzel, 2015, p. 520). In 
general, outcomes of autocratic and democratic pressure show that the latter is 
more successful in preventing autocratic behavior than the former is in promoting 
it (Way, 2016, p. 73-74).  
Those who see autocracy promotion as intentional claim that autocracies, just 
like democracies, have strong reasons to favor system convergence in their region. 
This is foremost due to the logic of rational choice and how foreign policy 
decisions are influenced by domestic conditions. Governments therefore weigh 
the costs and gains of external regime promotion against potential domestic 
effects. Although both democracies and autocracies prefer stability in foreign 
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relations, their differences in system convergence is caused by how autocracies 
base their legitimacy via provision of private goods, unlike democracies which 
secure this through provision of public goods (Bader et al., 2010). Autocracy 
promotion may also function through regional cooperation. However, while such 
collaborations often stave of domestic democratization in the region, they are 
driven by self-interest rather than ideology as the aim is to defend geopolitical 
interests and to uphold the respective power of regional governments (von Soest, 
2015, p. 629; Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015, p. 412-413).  
Regardless if autocracies promote autocracy or prevent democracy, they base 
their decisions on strategic rather than normative motives, which can be said about 
democracies as well. However, this assumption is challenged by Whitehead who 
argues that autocracy promotion is driven by the incentive to maintain status quo 
while as democracy promotion strives for change and is thus a more active and 
normative practice (Whitehead, 2015). 
Existing research offers several points of departure for analyzing the issue of 
restrictions against foreign funding. At the same time, it fails to explain for the 
increase of restrictions. In this sense, some gaps need to be addressed in order to 
provide a systematic explanation. Seemingly, opinions differ on how state 
capacity influence governments approach to civil society; whether restrictions 
signal domestic weakness to external pressure; and whether autocracy is 
expanding on behalf of democracy. Common for all however is that they shed 
light on how the interaction between domestic and external factors shape domestic 
political conditions. The following chapter will develop this further. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
This section will develop the thesis’ theoretical framework and the hypothesis that 
will be tested on the empirical material in order to answer the research question 
what causes some governments to restrict foreign funding to domestic civil society 
organizations while others do not. The theoretical framework is based on insights 
derived from the previous literature next to an elaboration of Levitsky and Way’s 
theory on linkage and leverage. The section starts by conceptualizing the 
relationship between restrictions against foreign funding and the struggle between 
western and non-western powers. In order to fill in the previously mentioned 
research gaps, the conceptualization expands on the importance of rational choice, 
external pressure and regional power structures. 
3.1 Conceptualizing restrictions 
The thesis argues that the previous literature fails to provide a systemic 
explanation for the increase of restrictions against foreign funding since this must 
account for the influence of the ongoing geopolitical power shift. The found 
research gaps all pointed to how domestic political conditions are shaped by the 
interaction between domestic and external factors, often dividing external factors 
into western, democratic and liberal next to non-western, autocratic and illiberal. 
To expand on these insights and connect them to the increase of restrictions, the 
theoretical framework will start by drawing some underlying assumptions. 
First, in order to account for reasons and incentives that drive restrictions and 
hold across various contexts, the framework assumes that actors base their 
decisions on the logic of rational choice, which for governments is guided by the 
incentive to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 8). This also 
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explains governments’ non-domestic behavior since rational choice assumes that 
foreign policy decisions depend on domestic conditions, determined by potential 
costs in the first hand and gains in the second (Tolstrup, 2015, p. 687; Odinius & 
Kuntz, 2015). The concept of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy further 
highlights the lack of difference between domestic and foreign actors since both 
act on basis of power, although justified by different international norms. In this 
sense, domestic governments draw on reasons related to state sovereignty to 
justify restrictions and maintain legitimacy (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2015, p. 
24-25; Dupuy et. al., 2014, p. 2; Mayhew, 2005, p. 743). In turn, foreign actors’ 
promotion of human rights and democracy are used to assert influence and fulfill 
strategic interests (Stuenkel, 2013, p. 340). Although non-western actors are 
strong advocates for state sovereignty, they will intervene externally if they 
perceive their power or geopolitical interests as threatened (Babayan, 2015, p. 
439). In this aspect, the norms preferred by western actors do not make them more 
benign, rather their legitimacy and influence rests on their credible commitment to 
such norms. At the same time, non-western powers preference for state 
sovereignty and self-determination inevitably puts them in an opposing position. 
Non-western powers are thus less likely to sanction restrictions against foreign 
funding. In turn, rational choice also explains how governments may always bear 
the incentive to impose restrictions to protect power but that this depends on the 
costs of norm-violating behavior. This is argued to better explain governments’ 
approach to civil society since restrictions are implemented regardless of weak or 
strong state capacity (van der Borgh & Terwindt, 2014, p. 134) and unrelated to 
whether the government perceives itself as legitimate or not (Bratton, 1989, p. 
575; Rotberg, 2004). While this allows for making initial predictions abut the 
conditions under which domestic governments and external actors exert top-down 
pressure, further assumptions are required to explain decision-making behind 
restrictions. 
Second, the theoretical framework argues that domestic factors alone are not 
capable of explaining restrictions since they do not properly account for the 
potential costs of external pressure (Gershman & Allen, 2006, p. 48; Burgerman, 
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2001). Thus, the framework assumes that governments’ calculations to restrict 
foreign funding to remain in power must take into account the costs of both 
external and domestic pressure. Imposed restrictions therefore indicate 
insufficient pressure since the government sees potential costs as negligible in 
comparison to regime survival. External pressure might come from foreign actors 
directly or via CSOs that alert their attention. Such boomerang effects have 
proven successful in raising the costs of regime repression (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998; Murdie & Davis, 2012). However, while external pressure may be 
sufficient, the impact might also depend on foreign actors’ ability to empower 
domestic actors to exert bottom-up pressure. In cases involving several foreign 
actors, their struggle to influence domestic conditions is much dependent on the 
domestic power balance (Börzel, 2015, p. 524-525). Seemingly, this can imply 
lowering the costs of restrictions since the struggles between western democratic 
and non-democratic pressure “works through the (dis-)empowerment of liberal as 
well as illiberal forces” in the target country (Risse & Babayan, 2015, p. 389). 
Foreign actors can also lower the costs without (dis-)empowering domestic actors, 
for example due to the protection of geopolitical interests (Chen & Kinzelbach, 
2015; Babayan, 2015) or the presence of strategic and economic agreements 
(Howell et. al, 2008, p. 87-89; Chahim & Prakash, 2013). In some cases, lowered 
costs are also related to outright protection or support (Dupuy et. al., 2014, p. 26). 
Third, based on the rise of new regional powers and the backlash against 
western norms, the framework argues that the geopolitical power relations 
between the west and the non-west are shifting. However, this impact clearly 
differs between regions, which can be seen in how restrictions seem to be more 
common in places where western influence and power is challenged the most 
(Buzan & Lawson, 2015, p. 293-294; Walker, 2016, p. 50-52; Börzel, 2015, p. 
525). That geopolitical shifts mainly operate at regional levels are also argued 
elsewhere (Bader et al, 2010). Thus, as power relations are redefined, the effect of 
norm diffusion processes and external pressure intensifies (Burnell & 
Schlumberger, 2010, p. 5; Walker, 2016). Regional power transition may bear 
upon both domestic conditions and the struggle between foreign actors’ external 
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pressure, which is indicated in regions where declining western influence and 
presence of rising powers often correlate (Jackson, 2010; von Soest, 2015; 
Whitehead, 2015). This shed further light on the assumption about the prevalence 
of restrictions in hybrid regimes and semi-democratic states since many of them 
lie in geographic proximity to rising or traditional regional powers (Carothers & 
Brechenmacher, 2015, p. 6; Gershman & Allen, 2006, p. 37). 
3.2 The theory of linkage and leverage 
To capture the dynamic of the previous assumptions, the theoretical framework 
borrows from Levitsky & Way’s theory on linkage and leverage (2010). While the 
theory seeks to explain regime outcomes, the theoretical framework is primarily 
interested in its attention to authoritarian behavior and domestic repression. In this 
sense, the theory help to describe the relation between a government’s western 
and non-western linkages and the cost of restrictions. However, the theoretical 
framework elaborates on some aspects of the theory in order to adjust it to the 
contemporary context and make it more suitable to the thesis. 
The linkage and leverage theory has furthered scholarly debates on 
democratization by arguing that explaining regime change should not give 
primacy to either domestic or international factors, rather their relative causal 
weight vary in predictable ways across contexts (Ibid, p. 38). Thus, based on a 
structural approach, the theory argues that a target government’s linkage to the 
west, its organizational power and vulnerability to western leverage determine the 
impact of external influence and how this reduce or increase the cost of 
authoritarianism and government repression (Ibid, p. 70-71). The influence and 
outcome of each factor is ranked differently depending on its level: 
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Figure 2. The three-step argument of linkage and leverage. (Ibid, p. 72) 
The theory’s definition of leverage “refers not to the exercise of external pressure, 
per se, but rather to a country’s vulnerability to such pressure”, which is 
determined by states’ comparative size and military and economic power; 
presence of competing western foreign policy objectives; and support from 
counter-hegemonic powers (Ibid, p. 42). Linkage on the other hand is based on 
historical factors, geopolitical treaties and geographic proximity. Linkages 
encompass several dimensions (economic, inter-governmental, technocratic, 
social, information and civil society) that operate through material mechanisms 
and diffusion of ideas and norms. Further factors also bear upon the impact of 
linkages. First, the diversity of linkages is critical in shaping political outcomes. 
Second, linkage and leverage may overlap so that linkages alone function as a 
form of pressure. Third, the existence of non-western linkages in a target country 
influences the impact of western pressure (Ibid, p. 50). 
Thus, a country’s vulnerability and linkages with the west determines the 
impact of external pressure. This shapes the interests, incentives and capabilities 
of the domestic government through external monitoring of abuse, international 
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reverberation (boomerang effect) and triggering of domestic opposition (double 
boomerang effect) (Ibid, p. 43-45). 
At the domestic level, the theory focus on the balance of power between the 
government and its opponents. In this aspect, the government’s organizational 
power is the basis for domestic political stability and consists of the strength of 
the ruling party next to the economic control and coercive capacity of the state. 
Both party strength and coercive capacity are defined by their scope and cohesion. 
Party strength refers to the party’s level of penetration in society (scope) and its 
ability to ensure cooperation from allied coalitions in the government, the 
legislature and at local or regional levels (cohesion). Coercive capacity on the 
other hand concerns the reach and quality of the state’s internal security sector 
(scope) and the level of compliance within this apparatus (cohesion). In turn, 
economic control mainly enhances existing party strength and coercive capacity 
and provides effective substitute power (Ibid, p. 56-70). Organizational power 
thus determines the ruling party’s ability to control the domestic opposition 
through legislative, economic and coercive power (Ibid, p. 68-70).  
The linkage and leverage theory is not without weaknesses. In this sense, Sasse 
has stressed the need for further consideration of domestic conditions, finding that 
the impact of linkages can be subject to domestic political competition under 
certain circumstances (Sasse, 2013). Tolstrup on the other hand object to the 
theory’s structural approach, showing how domestic elite agency may actively 
facilitate and constrain the impact of linkages (Tolstrup, 2011, p. 728-730). Both 
of these points are summarized by notions on how external pressure not only 
impact but also interact with domestic political factors, such as government 
coalitions or ethnic fractionalizations (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2014, p. 24-29). 
However, to some extent this is accounted for by the theory’s attention to non-
western linkages and party strength. 
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3.2.1 Adjusting linkage and leverage to the framework 
This section outlines in detail the elaboration and adjustments made to the theory 
in order to align it with the reasoning of the theoretical framework. This is argued 
for by two reasons. First, the authors state that the logic of the theory is only 
relevant for periods of western liberal hegemony (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 34). 
Due to the shift in geopolitical power relations, the thesis argues that this is not 
descriptive of the contemporary period. Further consideration of the factors that 
the theory holds as counter-balancing western linkages is thus needed, namely the 
impact of counter-hegemonic power and non-western linkages. Along with the 
previously mentioned critique, this also demands adjusting the theory’s 
assumption of linkages as fixed and external to governments (Ibid, p. 71-72) to be 
held as more subject to short-term change and the influence of domestic factors. 
In this sense, it could be argued that geopolitical power transition or norm 
preference will have a similar impact on linkages and the costs of repressive 
behavior, making the first a rather proximate cause for the latter. This is inevitable 
to some extent as certain linkages are grounded in historic and geographic factors 
and how external ties are, to at least some degree, always present in domestic 
conditions. However, the thesis argues that certain aspects of linkages make them 
exogenous to power transition or norm preference while still subject to short-term 
change. Primarily, this is due to the strategic and pragmatic feature of linkages 
which is foremost argued by how both domestic and external democracies and 
autocracies are driven by power and prone to alter norms in order to pursue 
strategic interests under certain conditions. In doing so, they may end up 
supporting counter-parts or cause costly outcomes that instead damage their 
interests (Petrikova, 2015; Reimann, 2006; Stuenkel, 2013; Krasner, 1999). This 
pragmatism also indicates the possibility that some ties withstand impacts of 
power transition and outweigh norms (Carothers & Youngs, 2011), while as the 
struggle between western and non-western external powers and their competition 
over influence make other ties subject to short-term change. This does not mean 
that linkages are capable of explaining most domestic political outcomes but that 
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their function through pressure and costs allows for making predictions about the 
dynamic between western and non-western linkages, though not in the same way 
as assumed under the monopolar conditions analyzed by Levitsky and Way.   
Second, the theory’s consideration of the relative importance of external and 
domestic factors in explaining domestic political outcomes rests on a three-step 
argument that include several combinations of causal paths (Ibid, p. 70-74). 
Consideration of all variables, and thus causal paths, is unsuitable for the thesis’ 
aim and beyond the thesis’ scope due to the number of case analyses it would 
require. The framework will therefore not consider the influence of organizational 
power and leverage to the same extent. In this sense, the framework argues that 
the relation between a government’s approach to civil society, state capacity and 
government legitimacy discussed by the previous literature is captured by the 
concept of organizational power. Thus, as restrictions occur regardless of weak or 
strong capacity and/or high or low levels of government legitimacy, 
organizational power hold little explanatory capability for this thesis unless seen 
in relation to linkages. Thus, like Levitsky and Way, the framework argues that 
the influence of organizational power is secondary to linkages. Also, 
organizational power is less considered by Levitsky and Way’s earlier works 
where it is mainly influential during low levels of both linkage and leverage 
(Levitsky & Way, 2006). However, the factor will be controlled for between cases 
since the struggle between external actors is argued to operate through the balance 
between domestic forces. Thus, organizational power might influence restrictions 
if or when it is capable to control the impact of linkages 
In terms of leverage, the inherent logic of the framework argues that this is 
subject to further consideration given the weight ascribed to the impact of non-
western powers. The theory reasons that three factors influence a government’s 
vulnerability to western leverage: the presence of competing foreign policy 
objectives; states’ comparative size and military and economic power; and support 
from counter-hegemonic powers (Ibid, p. 41). Looking closer at these factors 
indicate that they are equally likely to influence a government vulnerability to 
non-western leverage. Since the theoretical framework underlines the balance 
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between western and non-western powers as significant for explaining 
restrictions, leverage must be considered in the same way. In this sense, leverage 
can easily be reframed in terms of both western and non-western external 
pressure. Further, the framework argues that, due to the logic of rational choice, 
the presence of competing foreign policy objectives also adheres to non-western 
powers. The same applies to states’ comparative size and military and economic 
power, namely that it determines domestic vulnerability to both western and non-
western pressure. Also, support from counter-hegemonic powers simply aligns 
opposite western or non-western linkages depending on which is held as counter-
hegemonic. Given the attention to geopolitics and regional power structures, the 
framework argues that in this thesis, counter-hegemonic power is better defined as 
alternative regional power. This term is also used by Levitsky and Way in earlier 
works but then only include support to domestic governments (Levitsky & Way, 
2006, p. 383). The framework argues that an alternative regional power’s use of 
counter-pressure is capable of similar effects (Jackson, 2010; Tolstrup, 2015). 
In sum, the previous adjustments mean that the theoretical framework differ from 
the original theory in two important ways. First, the framework considers linkages 
as more susceptible to short-term change and influence from domestic factors. 
Second, the variables of organizational power and leverage are argued to be better 
understood alongside western and non-western linkages. Aligning leverage this 
way also means that the level of linkages determines the impact of pressure and/or 
support from western and non-western powers. 
 
Figure 3. Elaborated version of linkage and leverage theory. 
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The elaboration of Levitsky and Way’s theory get at the core of the thesis main 
argument, namely that restrictions against foreign funding depend on the ratio 
between western and non-western linkages in a target country. In this sense, the 
theory’s focus on regime change as the primary outcome includes the attention to 
authoritarian behavior and domestic repression and thus help to describe the 
relation between a government’s western and non-western linkages and the cost of 
restrictions. According to the theory’s central argument, high linkages mean high 
external pressure, and thus increased costs on a government. Where linkages are 
low, pressure is weak or intermittent, and costs for restrictions are reduced. 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 42-43). Thus, like Levitsky and Way, the theoretical 
framework considers linkages as the most influential external factor for explaining 
domestic political outcomes. However, due to the previous elaboration, the 
theoretical framework considers the counterbalancing impact of non-western 
linkages and counter-hegemonic power on western linkages to carry more weight 
than presumed by Levitsky and Way. Thus, the level of western linkages imposes 
sufficient costs on the domestic government only as long as it is higher than the 
level of non-western linkages. It is therefore the ratio, or balance, between 
western and non-western linkages that determines the domestic outcome, meaning 
restrictions on foreign funding. 
3.3 Hypothesis 
As highlighted by the theoretical framework, governments restrict foreign funding 
when they perceive civil society as a threat to power. CSOs targeted by 
restrictions are generally involved in politically-sensitive issues like democracy, 
human rights, transparency, accountability or other so called “government 
watchdog” functions. In turn, foreign funding and restrictions are argued to reflect 
a struggle between western and non-western powers. Thus, linkages describe the 
relationship between the two as it connects domestic state-society relations to the 
systemic competition between western and non-western powers and norms. 
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In this thesis, CSOs are defined as non-governmental, non-profit and formally 
organized entities. Besides CSOs, this includes nonprofit organizations, charities 
and public benefit organizations (Bloodgood et al., 2014, p. 721). In turn, foreign 
funding is defined as funding whose main recipients are CSOs operating in the 
target country. Foreign funding is sometimes used interchangeably with 
international aid or foreign support. However, foreign funding is the term 
commonly used in relation to closing space and restrictions (Wolff & Poppe, 
2015). Lastly, both non-western and alternative regional powers are defined as 
state actors that through pressure and alternative sources of support limit the 
impact of western pressure in a target country. This is meant to capture the rising 
states, non-traditional donors and new regional hegemons highlighted by the 
literature (Carothers & Samet-Marram, 2015; Cooley, 2015; Kagan, 2015). 
According to the framework, a higher level of western linkages increases the 
likelihood of western pressure to raise the costs for restrictions. In this sense, the 
extent of pressure from external monitoring, international reverberation and the 
domestic opposition may threaten the government’s international reputation and 
hold on power. Under such circumstances, whether the government has the 
incentive or not to impose restrictions, the potential costs of taking such measures 
are enough to at least tolerate foreign funded CSOs.  
On the other hand, a higher level of non-western linkages decreases the 
likelihood of western pressure to raise the costs for restrictions. In this sense, non-
western linkages counterbalance western pressure by providing alternative sources 
of support that reduce the target country’s dependence on the west or through 
pressure on the government. Under such circumstances, the potential costs of 
restrictions are negligible compared to the government’s incentives to remain in 
power and the potential gains of imposing such measures. 
Therefore, to impose sufficient costs on the domestic government, the level of 
western linkages, and thus pressure, must be high enough as to counter-act the 
pressure or support from non-western linkages. This still means that level of 
linkages can be high or low for both western and non-western powers, rather it is 
the ratio between linkages that determine the outcome. The main argument of the 
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hypothesis is therefore that governments restrict foreign funding to civil society 
when their linkages with western powers are outweighed by their linkages with 
non-western powers. 
Ratio of 
linkages 
Amount of 
pressure 
Cost of 
restrictions 
Outcome 
Western Sufficient Increased Government tolerate 
foreign funded CSOs 
Non-western Insufficient Reduced Government restrict 
foreign funding to CSOs 
 
3.3.1 Hypothesis for western dominated ratio 
The thesis hypothesizes that in cases where western linkages outweigh non-
western linkages, the government is less likely implement restrictions against 
foreign funding to CSOs since western pressure is sufficient to increase the cost of 
restrictions. Since the ratio favors western linkages both indicates that the 
domestic political balance supports liberal forces and increases the likelihood that 
western powers will respond with pressure to signal credible commitment. In turn, 
this makes the government more susceptible to western pressure both due to the 
gains of the linkages themselves and how the effect of norm diffusion ought to 
indicate the presence of a permissive approach to civil society. Thus, this 
increases both the potential impact of domestic bottom-up pressure and the 
likelihood that the government will commit or at least refrain from violating 
western liberal norms. Doing so would risk damaging the linkages with the west 
and result in external as well as domestic pressure that threaten government’s 
international image and hold on power. At the same time, favor of western 
linkages also limits the cost-reducing effect of non-western linkages or alternative 
regional powers. Thus, the government is less likely decrease its dependence on 
the west, change norm preference and find the costs of restrictions negligible 
compared to the potential gains. 
  26 
3.3.2 Hypothesis for non-western dominated ratio 
In cases where non-western linkages outweigh western linkages, the government 
is more likely to implement restrictions due to lowered costs. Favor of non-
western linkages indicate that illiberal domestic forces dominate the domestic 
political balance, thus increasing the likelihood of norms that favor state 
sovereignty and a government that is both less susceptible to western pressure and 
less permissive toward civil society. This reduces the potential impact of domestic 
bottom-up pressure. In turn, dominating non-western linkages limit the 
dependence on western linkages and the impact of western pressure due to 
alternative support and counter-pressure. This furthers the likelihood that the 
government will be less sanctioned for repressive behavior and perceive the gains 
of restrictions to outweigh potential costs. Strong presence of non-western 
linkages also increases the likelihood that an alternative regional power will seek 
to counter western pressure in order to protect its geopolitical interests. 
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4 Research Design 
4.1 Method 
The thesis investigates the research question through a qualitative comparative 
case analysis by using Mill’s method of difference for selecting cases and the 
structured focus comparison method for analysis. The design is congruent with the 
thesis aim as comparison is required to describe variance in the dependent 
variable, restrictions against foreign funding to CSOs. A controlled and in-depth 
approach is also suitable in order to capture complex relationships and analysis of 
a specific aspect of larger phenomenon. Further, the lack of studies on closing 
space in general and restrictions against foreign funding in particular highlights 
the need for a broadened research agenda. This must start with in-depth studies 
that test existing theory and generate verifiable hypotheses for future research. 
However, qualitative case analysis inevitably suffers from the dilemma of 
favoring internal over external validity. While this decreases the possibility of 
making generalizations to the overall population, in-depth analysis allows for 
stronger claims about the eventual findings (Gerring, 2011, p. 1144). 
The qualitative case analysis uses the structured focus comparison for testing the 
hypotheses. This method is strong when drawing causal inferences from a small 
number of cases as it allows for both in- and cross-case analysis (George & 
Bennet, 2005, p. 67-72). The structured focus comparison means collecting data 
on the same variables across cases by using a standardized set of general 
questions that reflect the aim of the thesis and its theoretical focus (King et al., 
1994, p. 45). This means that focus will only be placed on the aspects deemed 
relevant according to the theoretical framework. Thus, to allow for cross-case 
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comparison and test the argument of the thesis, data will be collected on domestic 
politics, civil society and linkages in each case. In turn, providing thoroughly 
formulated questions improves the reliability of the analysis and strengthens the 
method’s ability to link theory and empirical data. While the questions should be 
general as to apply to all cases in the population, this does not exclude the 
possibility of addressing some aspects more in-depth (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 
286). In this sense, the questions systematize the data collection and ensure 
comparability between cases while the emphasis on thesis aim and theoretical 
focus defines the analytical scope of the method (Ibid, p. 235-241). The method’s 
use of a disciplined focus on specific aspects is argued to account for qualitative 
case studies’ inherent dilemma of richness-parsimony trade-off (Ibid, p. 85) but 
also to assist analysis of complex scenarios, such as the one studied in this thesis. 
Still, the disciplined focus put great demand on data collection as not to risk the 
analysis of being oversimplified or specific, thus undermining the comparability 
between cases and the theoretical contribution (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 42). 
4.2 Case selection 
In qualitative studies, selection of cases deserves utmost attention given the risk of 
selection bias. This argues for the use of a purposive method. While such methods 
are inherently weaker in terms of reliability, they are still able to select 
representative cases with relevant variation on key variables (Seawricht & 
Gerring, 2008). In this sense, case selection is based on Mill’s method of 
difference. This method is suitable for a controlled comparative analysis when 
cases need to be as similar as possible but still include variance in one 
independent and the dependent variable. Essentially, the method structure 
similarity across variables, thus assisting in outlining the sequential order and 
more importantly, account for the effect between the independent and dependent 
variable. In turn, comparable in-case analyses of causal paths and intermediary 
variables are made capable by the questions asked to each case, which also assist 
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in controlling for spurious inference (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 207). 
The following control variables are based on what previous research consider 
influential in cases of closing space. These serve as criteria relating to the thesis 
objective and strive to ensure variation and limit selection bias (Ibid, p. 255). 
Cases that display similarity across these variables are argued to be fruitful for 
analysis and equally (in)vulnerable to external pressure, thus accounting for 
variance in the independent variable, and similar in permissive or restrictive 
approaches to civil society, thus controlling for bias in the dependent variable. 
Cases are foremost selected on the possibility of variance in the dependent 
variable, meaning that domestic CSOs must be recipients of foreign funding. 
Second, hybrid or semi-democratic regimes are one of the few concepts that 
are held as central in the growing literature on closing space. Thus, for the thesis 
to make a contribution to the discussion, this relation must be considered. This 
variable also holds instrumental value as such regimes often include linkages to 
both western and non-western powers (Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010). Avoiding 
cases that are categorized as strong or weak democratic or authoritarian states also 
limit bias against either one of the hypotheses as this risk including overly 
restrictive or generally permissive governments (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 123).  
Third, in order to account for the geopolitical power shift as argued for by the 
theoretical framework and to control for its potential influence on domestic 
factors and western linkages, cases must both be in geographical proximity of an 
alternative regional power. Such powers protect political, economic and military 
interests outside its borders and influence states in its geographic proximity. The 
scope is based on existing studies where Brazil, India, Russia, China and Saudi-
Arabia are common examples of powers that influence the state-society and 
foreign relations of their regional neighbors (Börzel, 2015; Stuenkel, 2013). 
Based on these scope conditions, the cases selected for analysis are Hungary and 
Georgia, the former being the case with restrictions against foreign funding. 
Contextual similarities are supported by a number of indexes except for a few 
differences in relation to corruption, violence and the dependent variable. 
Hungary is more fraught by corruption while Georgia scores slightly worse in 
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terms of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (World Bank, 2015; 
Transparency International, 2016; UNDP, 2015a; Ibid, 2015b). The V-Dem and 
Civicus Civic Space Monitor consider civil society as less open and more 
repressed in Hungary (V-Dem, 2012; Civicus, 2017). 
Both governments are classified as nations in transit by Freedom House. While 
Georgia is defined as a hybrid regime and Hungary as a semi-consolidated 
democracy, the two display similar scores in democracy, political and civil 
liberties (Freedom House, 2016; 2017a, 2017b). Both countries are in geographic 
proximity of western and eastern Europe. Russia therefore constitutes for both 
non-western linkages and the alternative regional power in the analyses. This 
might affect the impact and level of linkages as Georgia is a neighboring country 
with Russia. Still, comparison with other case pairs during the selection process 
indicated Georgia and Hungary as most viable for analysis. 
 Linkages 
ratio 
Hybrid or semi-
democratic 
regime 
Proximity to 
regional power 
Restrictions 
on foreign 
funding 
Georgia ? Yes Yes No 
Hungary ? 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
4.3 Operationalization 
4.3.1 Independent variable – Linkages 
As outlined by the theoretical framework, linkages is the independent variable 
argued to hold the most causal influence in explaining outcome in the dependent 
variable. Levitsky and Way define linkages as the concentration of economic, 
political, diplomatic, organizational and social ties and the movement of capital, 
people, information, goods and services. In turn, U.S., EU and western-led 
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institutions constitutes as bases of western linkages (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 
43). To account for the entire dimension of ties is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead the analysis will assess the level of western and non-western linkages 
based on: 
• Economic linkages (trade, loans, state aid or funding) 
• Inter-governmental linkages (ties with multilateral institutions, political 
ties) 
• Civil society linkages (funding, ties with international organizations, 
sentiments) 
These linkages are far from exhausting the variety of ties that may be present. 
However, the focus on economic, inter-governmental and civil society linkages is 
highly capable to assess for the impact of both material mechanisms and diffusion 
processes. (Ibid, p. 43-45). They also consist of a spectrum wide enough to 
control for the more exogenous aspects of linkages and indicate the larger 
diversity of ties that might exist in each case. All factors, besides the ones 
concerning state aid or funding, civil society sentiments and funding, are used by 
Levitsky and Way. The reason for adding these is to better capture foreign 
funding and the norm diffusion effect of linkages. Each factor is used to assess the 
level of western and non-western linkages. In turn, defining the ratio, or balance, 
between linkages is based on comparison between the factors’ cumulative level. 
Linkage General questions Outcomes 
Economic What is the target country’s western and 
non-western ties in terms of trade, loans, 
state aid or funding? 
What is the ratio 
of economic 
linkages? 
Inter-
governmental 
What is the target country’s ties with 
western and non-western multilateral 
institutions? 
 
What is the target country’s political ties 
with western and non-western actors? 
What is the ratio 
of inter-
governmental 
linkages? 
Civil society Are CSOs in the target country receiving 
funding from western and non-western 
actors? 
What is the ratio 
of civil society 
linkages? 
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Does civil society in the target country 
have ties with western and non-western 
political and religious organizations? 
 
What is the public opinion in the target 
country toward the west and non-west? 
 
 
4.3.2 Causal mechanism – Pressure and costs 
The influence of linkages is essentially measured in their respective success in 
raising or reducing the costs of restrictions. In turn, this means that the level of 
each linkage outweigh that of the other, thus determining the ratio between 
western and non-western pressure. However, if the analysis of the potential effect 
of linkages ratio is to be viable, the questions posed to each case must be general 
as to capture the onset of restrictions as well as alternative explanations. This is in 
line with the structured focus comparison as questions must be both clear and 
general in order to be applicable to all possible cases in the population. To 
account for the causal mechanism of pressure and costs, the following questions 
will be asked to each case: 
• Is western pressure operating through external monitoring of government 
abuse, international reverberation (boomerang effect) or triggering of 
domestic opposition (double boomerang effect)? Is western pressure 
threatening the domestic government’s international reputation or hold on 
power? Are western linkages successful in influencing the domestic 
government? Does the presence of an alternative regional power limit 
western pressure? Does competing foreign policy objectives limit western 
pressure? 
• Is non-western pressure operating through external monitoring of 
government abuse, international reverberation (boomerang effect) or 
triggering of domestic opposition (double boomerang effect)? Are non-
western linkages counter-balancing western pressure? Are non-western 
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linkages sanctioning repressive behavior by the government? Are non-
western linkages successful in influencing the domestic government? Does 
competing foreign policy objectives limit non-western pressure? 
• Does domestic elite agency strengthen or weaken linkages? 
• Does domestic political competition strengthen or weaken linkages? 
4.3.3 Dependent variable – Restrictions against foreign 
funding 
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law has listed the ten most common 
measures for restricting foreign funding to CSOs: 
1. Requiring government approval to receive international funding 
2. Passing ‘foreign agents’ legislation to stigmatize CSOs receiving 
international funding 
3. Limiting the amount of international funding that CSOs can receive 
4. Stipulating that international funding must be channeled through 
government-controlled bodies 
5. Restricting activities that can be supported from international funding 
6. Preventing CSOs from receiving funding from particular donors 
7. Applying broad anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering measures to 
restrict international funding 
8. Taxing international funding 
9. Imposing high reporting requirements for international funding 
10. Using other laws, including treason and defamation laws, to criminalize 
CSOs and CSO personnel who receive international funding (Rutzen, 
2015, p. 9-10). 
This list show that foreign funding can be restricted both de jure and de facto 
through measures that constrain the political, administrative and legal spaces for 
CSOs in various ways, including complete constraints, limitations, 
criminalization, stigmatization and administrative requirements. In order to 
capture the range of different measures in the analysis, the dependent variable is 
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defined as government policies and laws that restrict foreign funding to CSOs or 
decrease their operational capacity and security due to their status as recipients 
of foreign funding. Variance in the dependent variable is therefore based on the 
presence of at least one of the previously listed measures. 
Indicators General questions Outcomes 
Restrictions on 
foreign funding to 
CSOs 
Has the government 
imposed any law or policy 
that restrict foreign funding 
to CSOs? 
 
Has the government 
imposed any law or policy 
that decreases the capacity 
or security for recipients of 
foreign funding? 
Did the government 
impose restrictions due to 
lowered costs?  
 
Did the government 
refrain from restrictions 
due to increased costs? 
 
4.4 Data and source criticism 
Different kinds of secondary sources have been used to gather empirical material 
for the case analyses and the majority have been cross-referenced in order to 
ensure validation. To the largest extent possible, the data collection has gathered 
empirical material from well-known and reliable organizations (e.g. Freedom 
House, Civicus, Human Rigths Watch) as well as peer-reviewed academic 
articles (e.g. Journal of Civil Society, Eastern European Politics, 
Democratization) and books (e.g. Mitchell, 2012). Government documents from 
U.S. and different bodies in the EU have also been consulted. Data requirements 
along with recent developments in Hungary also demanded for the use of news 
articles. In turn, material was gathered from large international and well-known 
news sources (e.g. Washington Post, The Telegraph, Politico). The regional 
focus of the thesis required that less established secondary sources to be used 
given their expertise on the respective cases. Some of these sources are of lesser 
methodical quality than the preferred sources but are advantageous due to their 
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proximity to the cases. Still, this consequence on the analysis is deemed 
minimal. 
Control for bias has been the main challenge when gathering the empirical 
material. During the analyses it was quickly discovered that the contexts in the 
two cases were highly polarized and politicized. Adding to this is a divide 
between western and non-western sources, each being subjected to the risk of 
having limited access to opposing perspectives or incentives. In turn, consistent 
triangulation of several sources were used to limit the impact of bias and 
dependence. As an outcome, each answer to the standardized general questions 
rests on several sources. Still, the validity of the analyses is affected by the data, 
primarily due to the availability of data in English and from western sources and 
lack of reliable domestic and non-western sources. 
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5 Analysis 
5.1 Georgia 
Georgia’s development as a post-soviet state has been characterized by unstable 
domestic politics, internal conflict, poor economic performance and high levels of 
corruption (Bader et al. 2010, p. 94; Fukuyama, 2015, p. 21). Georgia was among 
the first of the so called color revolutions in Eastern Europe and central Asia 
during the early 2000s. The country’s own rose revolution was triggered by mass-
protests after accusations of election fraud in the 2003 parliamentary elections. 
This led to the ousting of President Eduard Shevardnadze and was followed by a 
free and fairly held election that resulted in a landslide victory for the United 
National Movement (UNM), led by the former opposition and CSO leader 
Mikhail Saakashvili. This raised hopes about successful democratization of the 
country and since then Georgia has been set on integration with the west, aspiring 
for membership in both NATO and EU (Mitchell, 2009; Muskhelishvili & 
Jorjoliani, 2009).  
The rose revolution has been held as a success by EU and U.S. Before and 
during the revolution, the two provided large amounts of funds to Georgian CSOs 
as part of their democracy promotion strategy in the region (Lutsevych, 2013, p. 
2). Georgia’s neighboring countries instead saw the revolution as a matter of 
political intervention, accusing western support to have aided the domestic 
opposition in its upheaval against the former government. This triggered strict 
measures against civil society among Georgia’s neighbors and is believed to have 
obstructed similar democratic revolutions in Belarus, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan 
(Demars, 2015, p. 239). The toughest measures however took place in Russia 
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where Georgia’s revolution was interpreted as a geopolitical confrontation by the 
west. Tensions were further heightened after the orange revolution in Ukraine as 
Russia’s influence in the region seemed to decline even more. This contributed to 
Russia implementing severe restrictions on foreign funding to CSOs and in 
exporting similar practices to its neighboring post-soviet allies (Koesel & Bunce, 
2013, p. 758; Demars, 2015, p. 252). 
Western civil society funding to civil society has therefore been held as a 
contributing factor for bringing about the revolution in Georgia. However, the 
long-term prospect of this support is looked upon with increased skepticism. In 
hindsight, several factors indicate that western funding has had a rather limited 
impact on consolidating democratization in Georgia (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2015, 
p. 464). The west has shifted its priorities toward strengthening the government, 
which in turn has responded rather undemocratic towards opposing views in the 
country. This has taken its toll on civil society and caused a stagnation of the 
democratic momentum in Georgia (USAIDb, 2016, p. 101ff; Cecire, 2016). 
 
Domestic politics 
After winning the presidential elections in 2004, Saakashvili and the UNM 
coalition set out to build a western liberal democracy. Constitutional amendments 
were made in order to strengthen the executive power of the president in the fight 
against the corruption and clientelism that characterized Georgian politics at the 
time. The government’s first period was fraught by media restrictions, lack of 
judicial independence and efforts to undermine the political opposition. Still, 
Georgians’ hope for democratization and popular support for UNM remained 
strong. The party won the majority of seats in the 2008 parliamentary elections 
but under accusations of unfair elections and due to a rather fragmented 
opposition. UNM’s second period merely exacerbated the democratic setbacks 
from the previous one and UNM’s popularity declined. In an attempt to regain 
popular support, the government started to exploit Georgians’ resentment against 
Russia by accusing the opposition for being closely tied to the northern neighbor 
(Mitchell, 2012, p. 127-135). UNM eventually lost the 2012 elections to a 
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coalition led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party. Despite the accusations, the new 
government has shown no signs of steering Georgia closer to Russia, rather it has 
reaffirmed the commitment to further western integration (Beacháin & Coene, 
2016, 935-937). 
Next to the government’s centralization of power, Georgia’s domestic politics 
after the revolution has been characterized by polarization. This combination has 
caused state capacity to be highly uneven across government institutions, most 
noticeable in rule of law and local government. Though reforms have been made, 
they are partial or largely undermined due to shortcomings in other areas (Cecire, 
2016, p. 8-10). State-society relations suffer from similar setbacks. After the 
revolution, many CSO and civil society leaders moved on to take up positions in 
the government. Seemingly, western funding followed along and shifted its 
priorities to supporting the government and decreased funding to CSOs (Pinol 
Puig, 2016, p. 29-36). This trend has continued in Georgia but together with a 
reverse pattern of former government officials returning to civil society. In turn, 
this has maintained clientelist structures in Georgian politics and limited civil 
society’s influence on public policy and its function as a state counterpart (Pinol 
Puig, 2016, p. 35; Broers, 2005, p. 345; Lidén et al., 2016, p. 287; EU, 2014, p. 6-
7). To some extent this is facilitated by EU and U.S. policy to uphold a strong 
pro-western ally in Georgia, which thus supports the government’s top-down 
decision-making. Also, close relations between the government and the west have 
limited CSOs’ function as an intermediary and further undermined rather than 
strengthened democracy (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani, 2009, p. 695). In turn, 
funding and support to CSOs is seemingly prone to benefit the government while 
undermining civil society’s autonomy since access to policy- and decision-making 
relies on personal connections or even open support (Civicus, 2010, p. 63; Pinol 
Puig, 2016, p. 25, 50). While this may seem to benefit EU and U.S. purpose, it 
also risks Georgia’s democratization since the structure has excluded most of civil 
society (Lutsevych, 2013). 
Georgia’s domestic politics also suffers from internal conflict with the northern 
secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which have strong 
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linkages to Russia. In this aspect, Russia has been accused of using the conflict in 
order to undermine the sovereign status of the Georgian government and 
destabilize domestic politics (Tolstrup, 2009, p. 937). In 2008, the situation 
escalated into a five-day war. After Georgia stepped up hostilities, Russia 
intervened in the regions under the claim of protecting its citizens as the majority 
of the regional population holds Russian passports. Shortly after winning the war, 
Russia increased its control over the regions and bolstered their legitimacy by 
recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states (Gerrits & Bader, 
2016).  
In spite of the lost war, pro-Russian and anti-western sentiments have been 
increasing in Georgia. Whether this bears on the public’s support for western 
integration is unclear. For example, some state that western integration was 
supported by the majority in both 2014 and 2016 (Edilashvili, 2014; Cecire, 2016, 
p. 5) while others find that it had dropped to only 42 per cent in 2015 (USAID, 
2016a, p. 102). In this sense, the 2016 parliamentary elections pointed out that the 
pro-western GD-coalition and the UNM are supported by most Georgians but are 
losing votes to anti-western parties. Still, only one openly pro-Russian party, the 
Patriots’ Alliance of Georgia, managed to get seats in the parliament, passing the 
threshold with just 0.01 percent (Lomsadze, 2016; VOA, 2016). So far, the 
domestic aspirations for EU and NATO membership seem to mitigate dissent and 
safeguard the government against Russian mobilization efforts in Georgian 
politics (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2013, p. 471). 
 
Civil society 
Although Georgian civil society is relatively open and unrestricted, state-society 
relations are defined by the centralized power of the government. Telling of this 
situation is that organized civil society is robust and diverse but constrained when 
it comes to influencing public policy (European Commission, 2013, p. 7; USAID, 
2016b, p. 106). In this sense, CSOs participation in policy- and decision-making 
processes is largely superficial. CSO involvement often stops after consultations 
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and the government use participatory processes simply to legitimize legislation, 
often without including CSOs. Besides these constraints, CSOs are also subject to 
the government’s use of state-owned media. Seemingly, CSOs that speak out 
against the government risk being denounced as confrontational or as part of the 
political opposition (Pinol Puig, 2016, p. 36-37). In this sense, the government’s 
approach to CSOs indicates that it perceives civil society as threatening. This is 
not entirely unwarranted given the polarization of civil society and that many 
CSOs act under the influence of political parties or movements (Cecire, 2016, p. 
6-7). This has even led to violent contention between CSOs where some instances 
show that this is driven by nationalism and anti-Russian sentiments (Strakes, 
2015).  
In terms of restrictions, the legal space for Georgian CSOs is largely 
permissive and without constraints. The administrative process of registering a 
CSO is easy and no restrictive legislation, government decree or policy exists in 
terms of funding, domestic or foreign. In this sense, the majority of CSO funding 
comes from foreign governments (USAID, 2016b, p. 101-102). In comparison, 
domestic government funding is marginal and CSOs often refrain from such funds 
due to the risk of becoming co-opted (Lutsevych, 2013, p. 12-15).  
Western support to CSOs is often framed as essential for having fostered ties 
with the west and for growing a pro-democratic public discourse in Georgia 
(Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani, 2009, p. 689-690). Illustrative of this impact is how 
the government just months before the revolution proposed a bill that would 
suspend foreign funded CSOs but which it was forced to withdraw due to strong 
domestic pressure (Broers, 2005, p. 339). For the west, Georgia therefore 
demonstrates the positive impacts of civil society support. In this sense, funding 
has been framed as a necessary or critical condition for empowering civil society 
prior to the revolution (McFaul & Spector, 2010, p. 118; Jalali, 2013, p. 57). 
However, the current situation is rather different. Western foreign funding has 
turned many Georgian CSOs into professionalized organizations which are 
disconnected from their local constituents. Further obstructing is how the 
continuous movement of political figures between civil society and the 
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government has fostered suspiciously close relations between state officials and 
CSOs. This has caused many CSOs to lack legitimacy and accountability in civil 
society. This is reflected by public opinion which see CSOs as aligned with 
political parties and foreign funded organizations as unreliable (Lidén et al., 2016, 
p. 287-291; Pinol Puig, 2016, p. 22, 26, 52). 
Distrust and polarization has also been furthered by the rise of pro-Russian 
sentiments in Georgian civil society in recent years. This has raised suspicion 
about Russia trying to influence and destabilize Georgia from the inside. Some 
suspect that this influence operates through pro-Russian and anti-western CSOs 
and media since information about their funding is largely concealed (Pinol Puig, 
2016, 54). Georgian politics seems divided in how to handle this balancing act. 
The government has tried to downplay Russia as a potential threat but it is not 
unified in these efforts (Edilashvili, 2014). In this sense, some government 
officials have called for banning or sanctioning pro-Russian opinions, for example 
by criminalizing denials of Russian aggression and controlling the process of 
attaining Russian citizenship (Strakes, 2015). At the same time, the government 
may also be put to blame for the increase of pro-Russian sentiments due to the 
protraction of Georgia’s integration with the west. In this sense, the latency of the 
process and the government’s overt focus on NATO and EU membership has 
become increasingly questioned by the public (Cecire, 2015). 
 
Linkages 
Following the revolution, Georgia’s ties with U.S. and EU have remained strong 
while the relationship with Russia has grown increasingly tense. Besides seeking 
to join NATO and EU, Georgia has also detached itself from Russian-led 
institutions. Even before the revolution, Georgia had joined the World Trade 
Organization and left the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The latter is an 
inter-governmental military alliance that consist of post-soviet countries included 
in the larger Commonwealth of Independent States, which Georgia also left 
following the war in 2008 (Sasse, 2013, p. 570). In spite of this, Russia is resolute 
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on furthering its interests in Georgia. The country holds geopolitical interest for 
both sides due to its proximity with major oil-producing states and the middle-
east. For U.S. and EU, this importance is furthered by strained relations with 
Russia, whose interests are furthered by control over the secessionist regions and 
Georgia’s function as an economic corridor for Russian businesses (Mitchell, 
2006, p. 669; Bader et al., 2010, p. 95).  
In terms of trade, Georgia’s main partner is the EU, followed by Turkey, 
Russia and China (European Commission, 2017, p. 9). Traditionally, Georgia has 
been vulnerable to Russian economic power due to its control over gas 
distribution. The tense relations between the two is noticeable in Russia’s 
arbitrary gas pricing. In 2008, Georgia paid almost double compared to Belarus 
and Armenia (Tolstrup, 2009, p. 935). Following the revolution, trade flows 
between Georgia and Russia deteriorated along with most other linkages. As a 
result, Georgia was struck by a doubling of Russian gas prices in 2005 followed 
by severe trade embargos in 2006. Since then, Georgia has diversified its trade 
linkages but resumed trading with Russia (Sasse, 2013, p. 569; Delcour & 
Wolczuk, 2013, p. 470-471). In 2014, Russia imposed new trade embargos after 
Georgia signed a trade agreement with the EU (Fuller, 2014). Georgia’s economic 
ties with Russia are also maintained by domestic oligarchs with ties to Russia and 
Russian companies invested in Georgia. Though, these ties are mitigated by 
Georgia’s large public sector and large-scale financial assistance from the west 
(Civicus, 2010, p. 21). 
Civil society ties are more divided. Seemingly, most Georgians identify 
themselves as European (Beacháin & Coene, 2014). A 2012 poll showed that a 
clear majority of Georgians trust EU more than the government and consider 
Georgia to have good relations with EU (Beacháin & Coene, 2014, p. 936). While 
most Georgians consider Russian influence to be negative, the support for joining 
the Eurasian Union, Russian-led alternative to EU, has grown steadily in recent 
years (Thornton & Sichinava, 2015; Thornton & Sichinava, 2016). Growing anti-
western and pro-Russian sentiments calls for questioning the depth of the 
Georgians’ ties with the west (Cecire, 2015). Seemingly, one influential source of 
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anti-western sentiments is the Orthodox Church. The majority of Georgians are 
Orthodox Christians and the church exerts strong political influence in the 
country. Although the church favors western integration, its protection of 
Christian morals and traditions draws on shared cultural values with Russia that 
opposes the influence of western liberalism (Makarychev, 2016; Rukhadze, 2016). 
The church’s influence is further indicated by the government’s passive approach 
toward it and in its capacity to mobilize the public against “threats” to Georgia’s 
traditional values (Lutsevych, 2013, p. 9; Beacháin & Coene, 2014, p. 936). 
In terms of funding, U.S. and EU are the two largest supporters of civil society 
in Georgia (USAID, 2016a; European Commission, 2016, p. 11). However, this 
parallels a strong priority on strengthening the Georgian state. In this sense, EU 
has diverted its support to political institutions and trade with the purpose of 
promoting good governance and rule of law (European Commission, 2013). U.S. 
state funding includes military assistance but also support to pro-government 
CSOs (Sasse, 2012, p. 589-590; Delcour & Wolczuk, 2013, p. 462-463; Stewart, 
2009b, p. 810). In this sense, Georgia has seemingly especially strong ties with 
U.S. that include personalized relations stemming from the close interaction 
between Saakashvili and the former Bush administration (Mitchell, 2012, p. 173-
174). 
Russian state funding on the other hand is mainly targeted at the governments 
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which outweighs other western linkages in the 
regions (Gerrits & Bader, 2016). Russia is suspected of funding to pro-Russian 
CSOs and political parties since such information is mostly concealed (Cecire, 
2015; European Initiative, 2016). Though, some claim that the most prominent 
anti-western “lobby” in Georgia, the Eurasian institute, is in fact funded by 
Russian sources (Gilbreath, 2015; Kartte, 2016). 
Seemingly, strong aid linkages have offset Georgia’s democratization process 
as U.S. and EU are more focused on supporting the effectiveness of the 
government. In this sense, western support is seemingly unconditional, 
considering the government’s illiberal behavior and the weak democratic progress 
in Georgia (Stewart, 2009a, p. 650). In one hand, the west’s incentive for funding 
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is to maintain close ties with Georgia and further their integration with the west. 
On the other, Georgia is also a vital case for legitimizing western democracy 
promotion. In turn, this has caused western pressure to fluctuate over the years. 
After the UNM lost the parliamentary elections in 2012, EU and U.S. put strong 
pressure to ensure that Georgia would have its first free and fair transition of 
governments. However, this was followed by political tensions and the use of 
extra-judicial means against the former government and met by nothing but mere 
warnings from the EU. Overall, EU can be seen as having toned down its critique 
while U.S. has merely noted the government’s democratic setbacks (Delcour & 
Wolczuk, p. 464-465). One example is the U.S. response to the government’s 
harsh attacks against protesters in 2007. After the attacks, U.S. instead 
emphasized the government’s decision to hold early elections rather than criticize 
the attacks (Mitchell, 2012, p. 173). Further problematic is how funding has 
stayed with certain groups in spite of them moving from civil society and into the 
government, thus favoring the political elite while weakening civil society 
(Stewart, 2009a, p. 650). One example of the consequences this has led to is seen 
in how CSO leaders which once promoted freedom of speech have sided with the 
government in deteriorating free media (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani, 2009, p. 
702). 
 
Conclusion 
Although the conditions in Georgia indicate the presence of several factors 
believed to cause restrictions against foreign funding this has not led to 
implementation of such measures. One factor is the government’s actions against 
civil society, indicated by accusations against the opposition, crackdown on 
protesters and the demands by government officials to sanction pro-Russian 
sentiments (Cecire, 2016, p. 7). Seemingly, both the political polarization and 
suspicions about Russian influence in Georgia could be reasons for the 
government perceiving civil society as threatening. However, the displayed 
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inability to balance different views in society also reflect the weakness of 
Georgia’s democratic institutions. 
The ratio of linkages was clearly in favor of the west. Whether western 
linkages explain the lack of restriction is obscured by how western pressure was 
relatively weak in spite of the government deviating from western and democratic 
norms. Seemingly, EU and U.S. had strong vested interests in making Georgian 
democracy work. This did both reduce pressure on the government and 
legitimized the deterioration of an enabling environment for civil society, which 
could be seen in how professionalization and clientelism undermined the public’s 
trust in CSOs. Still, CSO illegitimacy was not exploited by the government to 
implement restrictions. However, the government was able to insulate CSOs 
through other means, such as co-option and limiting access to policy-making.  
Russian linkages were strong in the secessionist regions but could not be seen 
as having any significant impact in Georgia overall in spite of alleged 
destabilization efforts. This proved to be mitigated by strong western linkages but 
also due to the war in 2008. However, while the policy to become further 
integrated with the west remained a political priority, the public support for this 
aim seemed ambiguous. Findings also indicated that the rise of anti-western and 
pro-Russian sentiments in Georgia could be explained by domestic dissent rather 
than non-western linkages, although suspicions existed regarding Russia trying to 
influence domestic politics through funding of pro-Russian CSOs. 
5.2 Hungary 
For long, Hungary was held as a forerunner among democratizing states in 
Eastern Europe. In recent years however, Hungarian democracy and rule of law 
have deteriorated. Since 2012, laws and constitutional amendments have 
centralized the power of the government and removed checks on the executive 
branch. This progress began after the Fidesz party and the smaller Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) secured two thirds of the parliamentary seats 
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in the 2010 general election (FIDH, 2016, p. 4). Fidesz’s leader, Viktor Orban, 
has openly declared his intents to build an “illiberal” state by claiming that liberal 
democracies are not viable in the current global condition and instead 
championing Russia, China and Turkey as successful examples (Simon, 2014). In 
turn, the government has increased constraints on civil society and especially 
against foreign funded CSOs. Such organizations now run the risk of being 
framed as paid political activists that promote foreign interests. This 
stigmatization campaign is voiced both by government officials and pro-
government media (Pickering & Holm, 2014; OHCHR, 2016). Further measures 
have included arbitrary administrative requirements, criminal charges, threats, 
raids and unlawful audits against foreign funded CSOs, mainly ones engaged in 
advocacy and human rights (Sherwood, 2015; OHCHR, 2016; Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2017). This has branded association with CSOs as dangerous and 
confronting and caused donors to withdraw their funding (Amnesty, 2015, p. 12; 
FIDH, 2016, p. 38-39). 
The EU has remained relatively passive toward Hungary in spite of declining 
democracy, rule of law and human rights violations (FIDH, 2016, p. 5-6) while 
U.S. has been more assertive. In 2014, Obama called out the Hungarian 
government for being repressive and silencing dissent. This was later followed by 
imposing visa bans on six Hungarian officials after evidence of high-level 
corruption (HRF, 2017, p. 6), which in turn triggered wide-spread anti-
government protests in Hungary (The Economist, 2014). 
 
Domestic politics 
After winning two thirds of parliamentary seats in the government elections in 
2010, the Fidesz-led coalition made several amendments to the Hungarian 
constitution. These changes occurred without the influence or involvement of the 
political opposition and civil society. Through these reforms, the government has 
centralized both legal and political power by undermining the independence of the 
court and other state institutions and removing checks and balances on the 
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executive branch. Implementation of further laws has weakened civil society and 
the opposition, restricted independent media and facilitated clientelism between 
the ruling coalition and the business elite in Hungary (FIDH, 2016). This progress 
has weakened state capacity in several aspects. Top-down decision-making and 
centralization of power have inherently undermined institutional coordination, 
regional governments and civil society’s access to policy-making and public 
consultations (Ágh et al., 2016, p. 20-27). This has resulted in a situation of 
reverse state capture as politicians use their centralized power to set up corruption 
networks in order to benefit the political and business elite in Hungary (Hegedűs, 
2017, p. 9-10). 
Hungary’s political landscape is highly polarized and consists mainly of 
Fidesz, the far right Jobbik party and a fragmented leftist wing (Enyedi, 2016, p. 
212-213). Up until 2014, Fidesz remained relatively unchallenged as the 
constitutional amendments and restrictive laws curbed domestic pressure from the 
opposition, media and civil society. Lately, Fidesz has experienced internal 
conflicts and lost considerable support (Ágh et al., 2016, p. 2). While this has 
meant a slight loss in legislative power for the Fidesz coalition, it has increased its 
control over domestic media and market (Hegedűs, 2016a, p. 3, Hegedűs, 2017, p. 
2). Simultaneously, Jobbik has gained political ground and become the second 
largest party in Hungary, going from two per cent in 2006 to 20 per cent in 2014. 
Both Fidesz and Jobbik have previously been harsh critiques of Russia but 
gradually changed this position. Though, Jobbik can easily be defined as far more 
anti-western and pro-Russian than Fidesz (Krekó et al., 2015, 5-6). Jobbik is also 
more right-wing, which has caused Fidesz to refrain from cooperating. Still, 
Jobbik’s growing influence in Hungary has steered domestic politics further to the 
right. This could be seen both in the government adapting a nationalistic approach 
to Hungary’s recent refugee crisis and how this resulted in regained support 
(Hegedűs, 2016a, 2-4). 
The state-society relations in Hungary are characterized by a general lack of 
trust and accountability. A 2015 survey show that Hungarians are highly skeptic 
and distrustful of domestic institutions, media and the EU (European Commission, 
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2015). Besides the response to the refugee crisis, the government’s populist 
rhetoric has not been able to improve its public image. This could be attributed to 
how high-level corruption, clientelism and lack of transparency have become 
standard features under Fidesz (Hegedűs, 2016b). On the other hand, the political 
opposition remains fragmented and has not been able to manifest as a political 
alternative. Although anti-government protests have increased in recent years, 
such sentiments have benefitted Jobbik instead of the left-wing opposition. Low 
voter turnouts also indicate that the public has grown apathetic toward domestic 
politics (Ágh et al., 2016, p. 3-4, 27). Although the government seems well under 
way in building an illiberal state, it is not completely immune to domestic 
pressure. An example of this is the government’s proposal of an internet tax that 
would have further undermined access to information and freedom of expression. 
The proposal was withdrawn after meeting wide-spread demonstrations, which 
also caught the attention of international media (BBC, 2014). 
 
Civil society 
CSOs operating in Hungary are not only challenged by the government. 
Seemingly, Hungarians display a relatively reserved approach towards CSO’s and 
many suspect organizations to be co-opted by political parties. The public does 
however have some basis for such doubts. In fact, disguising party-affiliated 
“pseudo” CSOs as independent is a deliberate strategy used by Fidesz and other 
parties, thus undermining the credibility of all CSOs (Gerő & Kopper, 2013).  
As been mentioned, the environment for CSOs has become increasingly 
constrained under Fidesz’s rule. This is noticeable in legislation that has increased 
administrative burdens and furthered control over CSOs areas of operations and 
engagement in political activity (INGO, 2014, p. 31-32). Further measures include 
obligations for CSO executives to declare private assets, restricted access to 
public documents and complex registration processes (FIDH, 2016, p. 32, 38, 42). 
In sum, these restrictions have caused many CSOs to give up and refrain from 
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influencing public policy (USAID, 2015, p. 116; Kelemen-Varga et al., 2017, p. 
39). 
Parallel to these laws, the government has increased restrictions on funding, 
specifically for organizations engaged in human rights, democracy and 
accountability (Tanaka et al., 2014, p. 28). The government’s control over EU 
funding in Hungary has allowed it to allocate funds arbitrarily and scale up 
eligibility criteria to include mainly long-term and sector-wide projects, which is 
beyond the capacity of most Hungarian CSOs. (Kelemen-Varga et al., 2017, p. 45; 
Ágh et al., 2016, p. 23). The government has also seized control over the CSO-
managed National Civil Fund, which seems to have led to selective distribution of 
funds to pro-government organizations and exclusion of CSOs engaged in 
activities deemed as sensitive by the government. Also, CSOs that have expressed 
or published criticism against the government has had their funding suspended 
(Ágh et al., 2016, p. 30; FIDH, 2016, p. 38).  
Due to this progress, several Hungarian CSOs have been forced to suspend 
their operations and become increasingly dependent on foreign funding. A 
substantial part of the government’s strategy towards civil society has therefore 
been explicit harassment of foreign funded CSOs. Most noticeable is the hostile 
rhetoric used by government officials and pro-government media which has 
framed such CSOs as agents paid to serve foreign political interests. In 2013, the 
government listed CSOs deemed as particularly problematic and released their 
names to the media (FIDH, 2016, p. 39-40). The government has also initiated 
audits and criminal investigations to stigmatize and intimidate CSOs, (Amnesty, 
2015). 
 The most noticeable case in the government’s campaign is the attacks against 
the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund. The fund was an obvious target since it 
supported many government watchdog CSOs and was, at the time, the most 
significant source of funding outside of the government’s control (GPP, 2016, p. 
21; Keller-Alánt; 2016; Kelemen-Varga et al., 2017, p. 45). The government 
accused the Norwegian government and the CSOs connected to the fund for 
strengthening the political opposition and denouncing Fidesz and the Hungarian 
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government. The government took several measures that intimidated CSOs, 
drained their financial resources, and restricted their work. In this sense, the 
government initiated an audit into 58 of the funded organizations, opened criminal 
investigations, raided offices and homes and suspended tax numbers of the CSOs 
managing the distribution. The audit later extended to involve funds from the 
Swiss-Hungarian Cooperation Programme, which co-founded some of the 
targeted CSOs. This caused Switzerland to temporarily withdraw funding, 
affecting over 30 programs and forced several to shut down (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2017; Open Government Partnership, 2016). Although the criminal 
investigations have since been suspended and the tax numbers reinstated, the 
government has achieved its purpose as the CSOs connected to the fund have 
been deemed as too risky to cooperate or be associated with (Keller-Alánt; 2016; 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2016, p. 5). Seemingly, foreign funded CSOs 
overall have self-censored due to the risk of similar measures (FIDH, 2016, p. 42). 
A recently proposed bill indicates that the government is determined to go even 
further in their attacks. The proposed “law on the transparency of organizations 
funded from abroad” would demand CSOs which receive more than 24.000 EUR 
per year to re-register, publically declare themselves as foreign-funded 
organizations and bring further administrative burdens and demands on declaring 
received funding (Amnesty, 2017). EU funding controlled by the government is 
excluded from the law (FIDH, 2017). The proposed bill is widely recognized as a 
replication of Russia’s “foreign agents law” (Liberties.eu, 2017; Tait, 2017), 
which has been successful in dissolving or restricting the operations of CSOs 
unwanted by the Russian government and has served as a blueprint for anti-CSO 
laws in other countries (USAID, 2015, p. 203-204; Hooper & Frolov, 2016). The 
proposed bill, which has been hinted of for years by the Hungarian government, 
has been highlighted by international media and foundations have raised concerns 
over funding possibilities in Hungary (Byrne, 2017; EFC, 2014; Ross, 2017). 
Even before the proposal, CSOs stated that the threat of the new law is enough for 
some donors to withdraw their funding (HRF, 2017, p. 4). 
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Linkages 
Due to its geopolitical position, Hungary has maintained strong linkages with both 
EU and Russia. This can be noticed in a foreign policy that emphasizes Eastern 
trade and Russian relations next to commitments to EU and NATO (Lowe, 2014; 
Simon, 2014). However, recent progress indicates that the balance is shifting 
toward Russia (Juhász et al., 2015, p. 10). In 2010, the government expanded its 
relation with Russia while decreasing its dependence on the west. This progress 
was later furthered by the government’s “Eastern opening” policy that aimed to 
provide Hungary with an alternative economic and ideological base that could 
counterbalance its western ties (Győri et al. 2015, p. 56). The ambiguity of this 
policy was made evident during the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 as the government 
formally aligned with EU’s position against Russia while simultaneously 
suspending gas flows to Ukraine. At the same time, Orban criticized the EU in the 
council of the European Union for sanctioning Russia and advocated for further 
economic cooperation in Eurasia. In 2015, Hungary broke further ranks when 
inviting Putin to Budapest (Ibid, p. 57).  
Besides improved relations with Russia, the Eastern opening policy has 
seemingly failed to deliver on its economic goals. On the other hand, the 
government has put further emphasis on non-western ideology, indicated by 
Fidesz’s illiberal state-building project and increased statements over the crisis of 
western liberalism (Feledy, 2015, p. p. 72; Juhász et al., 2015, p. 13). Even more 
notable are Jobbik’s aims to alter Hungary’s balance between the west and Russia. 
Although Jobbik and Fidesz are almost identical in their pro-Russian policies, 
Jobbik is far more anti-western and its position as the second largest party has put 
increased pressure on the government to distance Hungary from EU and NATO 
(Krekó et al. 2015, p. 5-7). Jobbik’s position towards Russia is much thanks to a 
few party officials and their facilitation of close relationships with the Kremlin. In 
2014, Jobbik’s party president, Gábor Vona, described Hungary as Russia’s 
access to the west that would help counter unequal ties and exploitation by the 
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west and preserve the autonomy of Eurasian regions (Juhász et al., 2015, p. 25-
26). Jobbik’s aspirations have increased Russia’s influence in Hungarian politics 
and have allowed Russia to further anti-western policies without jeopardizing 
Fidesz’s more robust linkages with the west. For Russia, Hungary’s value rests 
much on its membership in EU and NATO, which have provided Russia with 
channels to further its influence in Europe (Hegedűs, 2016b, p. 7-8; Krekó et al. 
2015, p. 7).  
In terms of trade, EU continues to hold a stable position as Hungary’s primary 
trading partner. Hungary’s trade with Russia has instead been characterized by 
fluctuation and imbalance between imports and exports, Russia being the third, 
respectively the 13th most important partner in this sense (Juhász et al., 2015, p. 
12). Counter sanctions between EU and Russia following the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014 explain the fluctuations (Than & Dunai, 2017) while as the trade 
imbalance is due to Hungary’s dependence on Russian export of gas, oil and 
nuclear fuel (Hegedűs, 2016b). Important in this aspect is Hungary and Russia’s 
recent nuclear deal in which Russia secured monopoly on the supply of nuclear 
fuel and granted a loan of 10 billion Euro to Hungary (Hegedűs, 2016a, p. 10; 
Vegh, 2015, p. 60-61). Russia’s interest in the deal was made very clear by Putin 
beforehand, stating that abandoning it would have “negative repercussions” and 
“damage Hungary’s national interests” (Kesztelyi, 2015). Critics have framed the 
deal as actually concerning Russia buying influence into EU via Hungary (Than, 
2015). Others have argued that the deal has kept Hungary silent over Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine (Győri et al. 2015, p. 57). The nuclear deal is also part of 
several corruption scandals that have linked the government to Russia. These have 
involved the granting of monopolistic access or public tender contracts to Russian 
companies through unfair bidding processes (Hegedűs, 2016a, p. 4-7).  
In terms of funding, Hungary’s main donors are U.S. and EU. U.S. aid to 
Hungary decreased significantly between 2015 and 2016 and consisted almost 
entirely of administrative costs (U.S. Government, 2017). However, U.S. primary 
support is through security assistance with the purpose of strengthening 
Hungary’s commitments to NATO (U.S. Department of State, 2016). In this 
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sense, the government has frequently stated its commitment to NATO and 
emphasized the alliance’ strategic importance for Hungary. Still, Hungary’s 
defense spending has not met NATO requirements during the last decade and the 
government’s behavior in the Ukraine crisis have raised questions about whether 
its solidarity lie with the west or the east (Schmitt, 2016, p. 11, 22, 27). 
 In regards to EU funding, Hungary was the third largest recipient during 2008-
2015 (CEP, 2016, p. 3). At times, this has been used by EU to put pressure on 
Hungary. In 2015 for example, EU’s suspended a large amount of development 
funds to Hungary after an investigation found that such resources had been 
mismanaged and distributed selectively by the government (European 
Commission, 2016). EU funding is also a crucial factor behind Hungary’s national 
growth in recent years. While the country is performing poorly in a number of 
economic and social sectors, the situation is deemed to have been much worse 
without EU’s financial support (Kesztelyi, 2017). Puzzling therefore is Fidesz’s 
critique against EU. A telling example is Hungary’s latest national consultation 
survey, carrying the motto “Let’s stop Brussels”, by which the government argues 
to gather support from the Hungarian population on harmful EU policies (Cerulus, 
2017). Notable in this aspect is that, besides inquiries about EU’s economic 
policies, two questions explicitly referred to the threat of foreign supported 
organizations against national security and sovereignty (Gotev, 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, aid linkages are highly precarious. Among the three largest 
donors of foreign CSO funding (Open Society Foundation (OSF), the 
EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund and the Swiss-Hungarian Cooperation 
Programme) only OSF seemed committed to provide support in 2016 (USAID, 
2015, p.114). The government and pro-government media have long accused OSF 
and its founder, George Soros, of funding foreign agents and the political 
opposition and have called for CSOs receiving OSF support to be thrown out of 
the country (HRF, 2017, p. 4). Orban and other Fidesz officials have publically 
declared that 2017 will be about dealing with foreign funded CSOs, especially 
those supported by OSF. Fidesz’s vice president, Szilard Nemeth, have stated that 
the opportunity for taking such measures has been enabled by the election of 
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Trump (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017, 18-20). This commitment was 
made evident by the government’s recent fast-tracking of legislation that imposed 
firm regulations on foreign universities operating in Hungary. The law has been 
accused of targeting the Soros-founded Central European University since it is the 
only foreign university not fulfilling one of the imposed requirements (Karasz, 
2017). 
Information regarding Russian non-state funding in Hungary is largely 
concealed. However, Jobbik is alleged of receiving funds from Russian sources. 
This has been suspected due to the party’s close ties with the political elite in 
Russia and that Jobbik’s expansion in Hungary occurred without receiving public 
funds. During this period, Jobbik was funded by a private donor accused of being 
a Russian spy (Juhász et al., 2015, p. 23-24; Foster, 2016).  
In regard to civil society linkages, the Hungarian public expresses stronger 
sympathies with the west than with Russia. Due to historic reasons, the Hungarian 
public’s view of Russia is generally negative and has left few social ties between 
the countries. One exception is the promotion of Turanism, the kinship between 
Eastern people, which is an important factor for far-right sympathizers, like 
Jobbik (Győri et al. 2015, p. 52-53). In spite of historic traumas, public support 
for Russian ties has grown in recent years (Juhász et al., 2015, p. 17-18). Still, the 
majority of Hungarians favor U.S. over Russia in regards to Hungary’s foreign 
relations. Pro-western sentiments are also held by the majority of Fidesz and even 
Jobbik voters (Hegedűs, 2016b, 3). Most Hungarians also consider that “Hungary 
should not distance itself from Europe and develop closer ties with Russia.” 
(Győri et al. 2015, p. 54). This is noticeable considering that the government’s 
control over media has been accused of spreading state-propaganda (FIDH, 2016, 
p. 31). 
In spite of the strong linkages, the west’s response toward the conditions in 
Hungary has rarely moved beyond political debate or expressions of grave 
concern (FIDH, p. 6-7).  However, affirmative measures are not completely 
lacking, illustrated by U.S.’s visa ban or EU’s suspension of development funds. 
However, even the European Commission’s use of one of its strongest measures, 
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country monitoring, has not been effective in strong-arming the government 
(Batory, 2016, p. 297-298). Hungary’s unbending position was recently illustrated 
by how the law on foreign universities was signed amidst massive domestic 
protests and criticism from EU and U.S (Rankin, 2017). Some believe that U.S. 
pressure on Hungary will decrease with Trump as president (Foer, 2016) as Orban 
was the first leader of an EU and NATO member country to endorse Trump’s 
campaign, allegedly considering Trump’s political views to give carte blanche the 
Hungarian government (HRF, 2017, p. 6-7). In turn, Brexit and the European 
refugee crisis could be factors that limit EU pressure (HRF, 2017, p. 6). More 
credible however is Fidesz’s association with center-right networks in EU, most 
evident being its membership in the largest political group in the European 
Parliament, EPP (Keleman, 2015). The membership has allowed Fidesz both 
political protection and the possibility to extend significant pressure over other 
influential countries in EU (Batory, 2016, p. 299; HRF, 2017, p. 6). This has 
previously constrained EU in using its strongest sanctioning mechanism, Article 
7, against Hungary as EPP together with other center-right parties opposed or 
abstained voting on the resolution (Sedelmeier, 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
No formal law against foreign funding to CSOs currently exists in Hungary. This 
also applies to the present draft bill as it does not explicitly restrict foreign 
funding but will, if implemented, expand the government’s legal possibility to do 
so. Still, Hungary classifies as a case of restrictions against foreign funding since 
the government’s policies decreased the capacity and security for recipients of 
foreign funding. 
The linkages ratio indicated that western dominated non-western linkages. 
Still, western pressure was not sufficient in deterring the Hungarian government 
from restrictions. Notable in this aspect are the efforts taken or proposed by EU 
against Hungary in spite of being a member in EU and NATO. In this sense, 
Fidesz’s ties with center-right parties under the EEP in the European parliament 
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indicated that western linkages worked in favor of the government and limited 
rather than furthered western pressure. In turn, Russian linkages operated both 
through material mechanisms and normative diffusion. The former could be seen 
in the nuclear deal while as the latter was evident in Orban’s admiration of 
Russian governance and in the current draft bill which had many resemblances 
with Russia’s foreign agents law.  
Considering that the majority of Hungarians did not seem to share the 
government or Jobbik’s pro-Russian policies indicate the impact of elite agency. 
However, this should have meant loss of popular support. In this sense, the 
constitutional amendments provide a potential explanation for Fidesz’s ability to 
remain in power while as Jobbik seemed to gain support due to the weak and 
fragmented left-wing opposition. Also, each party’s incentive to maintain a pro-
Russian position could be explained by economic ties with Russia, specifically the 
government’s corruption links and Jobbik’s alleged funding. 
5.3 Discussion 
Case Ratio of 
linkages 
Amount of 
pressure 
Cost of 
restrictions 
Outcome 
Georgia Western Insufficient ? Government tolerated 
foreign funded CSOs 
Hungary Western Insufficient Reduced Government restricted 
foreign funding to CSOs 
 
The analyses indicated that the linkage ratio was dominated by the west in both 
cases, thus finding only partial support for the hypothesis. In spite of high levels 
of western linkages in Georgia and the government’s pro-western policy, the 
analysis found that instances of repressive government behavior were not met by 
western pressure. Instead, EU and U.S. prioritized their interest in maintaining a 
stable government in Georgia. Although the government’s behavior indicated that 
it perceived civil society as threatening, imposing restrictions on foreign funding 
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would have meant a clear escalation of repressive behavior. The thesis assumes 
that this would have most likely jeopardized Georgia’s membership in EU and 
NATO, especially considering that the majority of foreign funding to CSOs came 
from the west. Still, some support for the the hypothesis was found in the analysis, 
though in relation to the revolution. This was indicated by how western funding 
seemingly functioned as a contributing factor in creating domestic pressure on the 
government while similar outcomes were curbed in neighboring states, allegedly 
assisted by Russia’s export of restrictive laws. 
In Hungary, western pressure seemed largely ineffective both in spite and 
because of high level of western linkages. In this sense, Fidesz’s ties with the EPP 
proved to have a mitigating impact on western pressure. This reverse effect of 
western linkages was not accounted for by the theoretical framework. The 
analysis also found that Russian linkages provided alternative support and 
pressure on Hungary. To some extent this was greatly facilitated by the 
government’s own attempts to strengthen ties with Russia, indicated by the 
Eastern opening policy and the nuclear deal. However, Russia also had a vested 
interest in maintaining the government’s western linkages in order to extend own 
influence into EU and NATO. This effect was also not accounted for by the 
theoretical framework and could further explain why western pressure was 
insufficient in spite of strong linkages.  
In both cases, non-western linkages and the alternative regional power was 
represented by Russia. Interesting therefore is Hungary’s historic and Georgia’s 
recent experiences of Russia. In spite of this, pro-Russian sentiments were 
increasing in both cases, both in politics and civil society. The findings also 
indicated that this could be due to anti-western opinions, thus underlining how 
linkages are prone to short-term change and subject to the influence of domestic 
factors. In this sense, anti-western attitudes were seemingly stronger in Georgian 
civil society than in the government, while the situation was the opposite in 
Hungary. However, in Hungary, the public’s skeptic approach toward EU next to 
negative views on ties with Russia show that pro-Russian and anti-western 
opinions do not necessarily go together.  
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This contrary shed light on Tolstrup’s point regarding elite agency. In this 
aspect, each case indicated that further integration with the west vis-à-vis the east 
was an undertaking mainly concentrated amongst the political elite in each 
country. The impact of elite agency was perhaps most noticeable in Jobbik where 
the shift toward a pro-Russian position was facilitated by a handful of party 
officials. Elite agency was also found in Georgia’s close ties with U.S., consisting 
of personalized relationships originating from close interaction between 
Saakashvili and the Bush administration. 
In Hungary, the strongest non-western linkage consisted of economic ties, 
mainly through trade and the recent large-scale nuclear deal. Although level of 
these economic linkages can be attributed to Hungarian government itself, the 
nuclear deal gave proof of Russian pressure on the government. Closely behind 
was Hungary’s political ties with Russia, which explain the government’s 
pendulum politics and increased tendency to break ranks with EU policies, most 
noticeable during the Ukraine crisis. In Georgia, strong non-western linkages were 
found in the secessionist regions, where they also trumped all other western 
linkages. However, besides a five-day war, this did not seem to have any larger 
impact in the rest of Georgia in spite of Russia’s interests in the country. 
Although, the Orthodox Church drew on shared values with Russia, this did not 
function as a ground for non-western linkages. Rather, the church furthered anti-
western sentiments in spite of supporting western integration. 
Western linkages were strong in both cases but differed most in terms of 
intergovernmental ties due to Hungary’s membership in EU and NATO. 
According to the hypothesis, this would have furthered western pressure but did in 
fact lead to the opposite. In Georgia, any potential pressure that could be derived 
from the country’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO was outweighed by 
competing foreign policy objectives, causing the west’s interest of legitimizing its 
democracy promotion in Georgia to facilitate the government’s non-democratic 
tendencies and top-down governance. 
In terms of the research question what causes some governments to restrict 
foreign funding to domestic civil society organizations while others do not, 
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comparing the two cases indicate that their differences are connected to non-
western linkages, thus lending some support the thesis main argument about 
geopolitical shift as a systemic explanation for the increase of restrictions. This is 
evident when comparing the cases on one important aspect. While the centralized 
power of both governments allowed them to limit the influence of CSOs, the 
government in Hungary still moved further to implement restrictions. In this 
sense, non-western linkages were clearly stronger in Hungary, restrictions 
seemingly copied Russia’s foreign agents law and correlated with Fidesz’s shift in 
position toward Russia. In Georgia, it could be assumed that the government did 
not resort to restrictions due to the lack of strong non-western linkages together 
with strong western ones. However, the west’s competing foreign policy 
objectives in the country make it difficult to expect whether such measure would 
have been sanctioned. This conclusion demands a closer look at contextual factors 
and alternative explanations. 
In Hungary, most of the targeted CSOs were government watchdogs or 
fulfilled other state counterpart functions, thus pointing to restrictions as driven by 
incentives to protect the hold on power. However, looking at what enabled the 
government to eventually take such measures must account for Fidesz’s larger 
illiberal state-building project and the Eastern opening policy, which were 
pursued in spite of western pressure. Outwardly, this seemed clearly influenced by 
non-western linkages, evident in Hungary’s overall extension toward Russia and 
away from the west. However, Fidesz’s centralized power also facilitated a 
condition of reverse state capture that enabled high-level corruption and strong 
economic linkages with Russia. This point to the possibility that the government 
implemented restrictions in order to avoid accountability and protect economic 
interests, thus indicating autocratic behavior as such regimes rests on provision 
private goods in order to remain in power. Therefore, although non-western 
linkages decreased Hungary’s dependency on western linkages, Fidesz’s illiberal 
state-building project itself holds explanatory capability for the implementation of 
restrictions. 
In Georgia, the government’s repressive behavior was not fueled or permitted 
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by non-western linkages, rather UNM’s accusations and the proposals to sanction 
pro-Russian sentiments indicate the opposite. Thus, together with the lack of both 
western and domestic pressure point out that any potential constraints that 
hindered restrictions are most likely due to the government itself, presumably 
incentives for maintaining good relations with the west. This could rest on both 
negative and positive motivation due the risk of jeopardizing EU and NATO 
membership and because of the protection and benefits inherited in the west’s 
unconditional support. Still, whether this would have changed had the government 
implemented restrictions is only moderately assumed based on the findings. 
However, comparing Hungary and Georgia points to a factor that provide 
alternative explanations in both cases, namely the influence of elections. In this 
sense, both cases indicated that while elections were not always free and fair they 
were able to alter the power of the ruling party. Important is that this showed how 
the governments drew on nationalist, anti-western or anti-Russian sentiments in 
order to gain support and/or defame the opposition. Accusations against foreign 
influence could be noticed in both cases, though referring to different sources. In 
Hungary this could mean that restrictions were used to gain support, thus 
indicating that such measure may be driven by other incentives than direct threat 
to power, like the possibility to expand power. However, although Fidesz 
remained in power, the large-scale domestic protests against the law on foreign 
universities argue against this conclusion. 
A further and perhaps more credible alternative explanation for the outcomes 
in both cases is in fact the impact of organizational power. In Georgia, the 
centralized power of the government could explain how it could continue to 
propagate for western integration and limit itself against the impact of Russia’s 
efforts to influence domestic politics. In Hungary, the government’s centralization 
of power seemed to result in an overall invulnerability against western and 
domestic pressure while allowing the pursuit of further ties with Russia. However, 
it should be noted that the elections which granted the governments their hold on 
power in each case lacked a strong opposition, thus hinting of Sasse’s argument 
about the importance of domestic political competition. In following elections, 
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UNM was eventually toppled while as Fidesz remained in power, much due to its 
ability to control state institutions but also because of the fragmented left-wing 
The thesis has several limitations that must be noted. Obvious from the previous 
point is the cases themselves. Although much concern was put into the case 
selection, there are clear limitations to the generalizability of their findings as 
their representativeness of the overall population can be questioned. First, the way 
in which the government in Hungary actively sought to build an illiberal state and 
strengthen non-western linkages questions whether similar government efforts 
would be as active, and thus observable, in other cases. Also, both western and 
non-western linkages in Hungary did not operate as assumed by the theoretical 
framework. Thus, drawing any assumptions about whether these specific findings 
are typical or deviating for linkages are also undermined as Hungary’s status as a 
representative case can be questioned. Second, Georgia proved to be held as one 
of few cases which demonstrate the positive impact of western democracy support 
and civil society funding. This could be grounds for considering Georgia as a rare 
case. This also contributed to the presence of western competing foreign policy 
objectives, resulting in unconditional support and almost complete lack of 
pressure. Thus, whether this would have occurred in other cases with the same 
level of western linkages can be questioned. Further, the data collection on some 
indicators found that many sources explicitly referred to the east/west geographic 
divide of the cases in relation to their recent developments and Russian influence. 
While this questions whether similar data would be as specific for other cases, it 
may also hint of Hungary and Georgia’s representativeness as a case pair. 
Further limitations stem from the operationalization of the independent 
variable. Categorizing the included ties as west or non-west proved to reflect the 
general direction of those not included, except for information linkages. Such ties 
were not accounted for but found to be significant for Russian influence in both 
cases. Several sources highlighted how anti-western propaganda was used by 
Russia or domestic pro-Russian actors to weaken western linkages. In sum, this 
could have affected the linkage ratio in Hungary had it been included. However, 
the sources discussing the use of anti-western propaganda could be suspected of 
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bias as they clearly reflected the highly politicized and polarized domestic 
conditions that characterized the cases. Further, the structured focus comparison 
proved mostly capable of determining the level and ratio of linkages. However, 
the lack of findings on some indicators questions whether the use of a different 
qualitative method would have led to the same conclusion, thus affecting the 
reliability of the thesis. This limitation was made evident when determining civil 
society ties with international organizations and the level of non-western funding 
and aid linkages. However, this proved problematic in both cases and similar 
efforts come across in the data collection supported the complexity of analyzing 
these specific ties. Nonetheless, lack of findings on civil society ties meant that it 
was largely left out while as conclusions about non-western funding and aid had 
to be based on suspicions. 
Lastly, the thesis suffered from shortcomings of the theoretical framework. In 
this sense, the findings indicated that the relation between linkages and pressure 
are not necessarily one-directional or that the struggle over linkages function as a 
zero-sum game. This was noticeable in Hungary due to the reverse effect of strong 
western linkages and in how Russia used western linkages to further non-western 
influence. Findings from Georgia indicated that a government with strong western 
linkages can exert illiberal behavior, and that this can be directed explicitly 
toward non-western sentiments. 
In spite of these limitations, the thesis’ research design and theory was proven 
strong in other important aspects. For example, the structured focus comparison 
assisted in keeping the analyses centered on the proposed causal mechanism and 
in controlling for alternative influencing variables. The method also allowed for 
in-depth analyses into certain ties. Controlling for organizational power showed 
that state capacity and government legitimacy was characterized by centralization 
of power in both cases. Important in this aspect was that the findings indicated 
that linkages carried more weight as only Hungary decided to further limit the 
influence of CSOs by imposing restrictions. Also, if the Fidesz-coalition had not 
been able to secure the majority of parliamentary seats, which allowed them to 
amend the constitution, they might not have remained in power. Still, their 
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assertiveness to do so in spite of the risk of western pressure indicate that such 
incentives could be reinforced by an alternative source of support. 
Asking a set of general questions to the same variables in each case proved 
essential considering the complexity of the contexts. In this aspect, the 
shortcoming in data collection correlated between the cases, which is therefore 
argued to limit any potential effect on the results. In turn, in-depth analyses 
showed that lack of data on the specific indicators could be an issue more related 
to Russia rather than non-western powers per se. 
The operationalization of the variables proved to be valid and allowed for 
defining the linkage ratio and implementation of restrictions. In this sense, the 
indicators in the independent variable was capable of accounting for the impact of 
linkages through both material mechanisms and norm diffusion. Also, the 
variance between formal laws and informal restrictions of the dependent 
variable’s proved significant, thus highlighting the de facto aspect of restrictions 
(Rutzen, 2015). 
The main theoretical contribution of the thesis stems from its elaboration of the 
linkage and leverage framework. The adjustments proved highly capable of 
accounting for the balance between western and non-western linkages and their 
interaction with domestic factors. This also proved that linkages are subject to 
short-term change and the influence of domestic factors, which in turn highlighted 
how the west/non-west direction of linkages can differ significantly within a 
country. Although the analysis did not confirm the hypothesis, the findings 
underlined that the shift in geopolitical power relations and norms is an ongoing 
struggle observable in practice. The specific region under analysis therefore give 
some support the thesis’ main claim. Lastly, the thesis argues that further 
adjustments to the theoretical framework will strengthen its use as a model for 
explaining how competition between external factors over domestic influence 
impacts civil society. 
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6 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this thesis was to answer what causes some governments to 
restrict foreign funding to domestic civil society organizations while others do not 
in order to explain the recent increase of such measures and further the 
understanding about the larger trend of closing space. The main claim of the thesis 
was that changes in geopolitical power relations explains repressive government 
behavior and domestic political outcomes. To test this claim, the thesis elaborated 
on Levitsky and Way’s theory on linkage and leverage, arguing that the ratio 
between western and non-western linkages in a target country determines the 
costs of a governments repressive behavior, specifically restrictions on foreign 
funding. However, the findings from the case analyses on Georgia and Hungary 
did not support the thesis hypothesis although they indicated that the main 
argument could still serve as a possible explanation for outcomes in both cases. At 
the same time, alternative explanations together with some methodological and 
theoretical boundaries limit the the explanatory capability of the thesis. 
That geopolitical power relations are in transition was evident in how the west 
and Russia struggled over linkages in the two cases. The linkage ratio favored the 
west in both cases but did not operate according to the hypothesis. In Hungary, 
Fidesz’s ties within the European parliament limited rather than strengthened 
western pressure on the government while as Russia maintained Hungary’s 
western linkages to gain further influence in EU and NATO. This showed that the 
relation between linkages and pressure are not necessarily one-directional or that 
the struggle over linkages function as a zero-sum game, even under conditions of 
power transition. In Georgia, the government did not implement restrictions but 
strong western linkages did not deter the government from illiberal behavior. 
Instead western pressure was limited due to EU and U.S. competing foreign 
policy objectives. However, the thesis assumes that implementation of restrictions 
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could have jeopardized the governments western linkages and their possibility of 
joining EU and NATO. Further findings showed that linkages are subject to short-
term change, the influence of domestic factors and that the west/non-west 
direction of linkages can differ significantly within a country. 
The thesis recommends further research to first and foremost look at further 
cases, specifically starting with non-post-soviet states and where non-western 
linkages are not manifested by Russia. Studies ought also to investigate contexts 
with restrictions where the target country’s western and non-western linkages are 
less defined, that include strong domestic pressure or where the public majority 
holds a more positive approach toward CSOs. The thesis also recommends further 
research to test assumptions about the two-directional impact of linkages, 
specifically looking at how they may serve to function in favor of norm-violating 
domestic governments or external opposing powers. Lastly, to shed further light 
on the actual reasons behind restrictions, research should investigate how 
elections hold legitimizing function for repressive governments, if restrictions are 
implemented without strong non-western linkages and if restrictions explicitly 
target CSOs with non-western ties.   
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